Improving Collaboration Between Drivers and Automated Vehicles with Trust Processing Methods by Azevedo Sa, Hebert
Improving Collaboration Between Drivers and




A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Robotics)
in The University of Michigan
2021
Doctoral Committee:
Associate Professor Lionel Robert, Co-Chair
Professor Dawn Tilbury, Co-Chair
Professor Brent Gillespie
Professor Nadine Sarter




© Hebert Azevedo Sá 2021
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ABSTRACT
Trust has gained attention in the Human-Robot Interaction (HRI) field, as it is
considered an antecedent of people’s reliance on machines. In general, people are
likely to rely on and use machines they trust, and to refrain from using machines
they do not trust. Recent advances in robotic perception technologies open paths
for the development of machines that can be aware of people’s trust by observing
their human behaviors. This dissertation explores the role of trust in the interactions
between humans and robots, particularly Automated Vehicles (AVs). Novel methods
and models are proposed for perceiving and processing drivers’ trust in AVs and for
determining both humans’ natural trust and robots’ artificial trust.
Two high-level problems are addressed in this dissertation: (1) the problem of
avoiding or reducing miscalibrations of drivers’ trust in AVs, and (2) the problem of
how trust can be used to dynamically allocate tasks between a human and a robot
that collaborate.
A complete solution is proposed for the problem of avoiding or reducing trust mis-
calibrations. This solution combines methods for estimating and influencing drivers’
trust through interactions with the AV. Three main contributions stem from that
solution: (i) the characterization of risk factors that affect drivers’ trust in AVs,
which provided theoretical evidence for the development of a linear model for driver
trust in AVs; (ii) the development of a new method for real-time trust estimation,
which leveraged the trust linear model mentioned above for the implementation of a
Kalman-filter-based approach, able to provide numerical estimates from the process-
ing of drivers’ behavioral measurements; and (iii) the development of a new method
xiv
for trust calibration, which identifies trust miscalibration instances from comparisons
between drivers’ trust in the AV and that AV’s capabilities, and triggers messages
from the AV to the driver. These messages are effective for encouraging or warn-
ing drivers that are undertrusting or overtrusting the AV capabilities respectively as
shown by the obtained results.
Although the development of a trust-based solution for dynamically allocating
tasks between a human and a robot (i.e., the second high-level problem addressed
in this dissertation) remains an open problem, we take a step forward in that di-
rection. The fourth contribution of this dissertation is the development of a unified
bi-directional model for predicting natural and artificial trust. This trust model is
based on mathematical representations of both the trustee agent’s capabilities and
the required capabilities for the execution of a task. Trust emerges from comparisons
between the agent capabilities and task requirements, roughly replicating the follow-
ing logic: if a trustee agent’s capabilities exceed the requirements for executing a
certain task, then the agent can be highly trusted (to execute that task); conversely,
if that trustee agent’s capabilities fall short of that task requirements, trust should be
low. In this trust model, the agent’s capabilities are represented by random variables
that are dynamically updated over interactions between the trustor and the trustee
whenever the trustee is successful or fails in the execution of a task. These capability
representations allow for the numerical computation of human’s trust or robot’s trust,






Trust is a topic that has recently received considerable attention from human-robot
interaction (HRI) researchers [64]. Trust facilitates cooperation between people, as
well as between people and automated systems, like robots. [44]. HRI researchers
expect that, in the future, robots will be able to understand people’s behaviors and
adapt their own behaviors to enable seamless human-robot interactions. Robots will
likely have to take people’s trust into consideration when autonomously making de-
cisions or taking physical actions in their operating environment [36].
The intent of this dissertation is to extend the state-of-the-art trust-related knowl-
edge, in order to solve problems that emerge when people interact with robots—
particularly when these robots are Automated Vehicles (AVs) and those people as-
sume the role of AV drivers. To accomplish this, this dissertation proposes methods
for trust processing—i.e., measuring and influencing trust—that are useful for solving
two main research problems: reducing trust miscalibrations and dynamically allocat-
ing tasks between human and robot collaborators.
Trust miscalibrations occur when there is a misalignment between the human
operators’ trust in the system and the system’s capabilities [60]. Trust miscalibrations
are likely to lead to inappropriate reliance on a system. A solution offered in this
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dissertation to reducing trust miscalibrations is to implement a trust estimator and
a trust calibrator that are able to manage trust.
Dynamic task allocation refers to assigning tasks to the human operator and to
the robot, considering their different capabilities when they work together in a team.
Establishing an analogy between human-human teams and human-robot teams, trust
is a key element of the task allocation problem when agents are peers. Each agent
has its own opinion of which agent should be executing each task, and this opinion
should be based on trust.
The following chapters will explore how trust between drivers and AVs can be
processed to solve the problems described above in the driver-AV interaction context.
Each chapter presents a contribution and is based on a journal article that has already
been published. Those articles are directed at answering the following four high-level
research questions:
(i) how does risk affect AV trust and drivers’ trusting behaviors (addressed in
Chapter III, which is based on publication [10])?
(ii) how to measure drivers’ trust in AVs (addressed in Chapter IV, based on pub-
lication [6])?
(iii) how to influence and calibrate drivers’ trust in AVs (addressed in Chapter V,
based on publication [7])?
(iv) how to use trust to assign tasks between a human and an automated system,
which, in this case, could be an AV or a different robot (addressed in Chapter VI,
based on publications [8] and in [9])?
1.1.1 How Does Risk Affect AV Trust and Drivers’ Trusting Behaviors?
The Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) defines six levels of driving automa-
tion ranging from 0 to 5, where 0 stands for “no driving automation” and 5 for “full
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Figure 1.1: SAE J3016 levels of driving automation [101].
driving automation”. Figure 1.1 presents a summarized description of these automa-
tion levels and their main characteristics. The term automated driving system (ADS)
is used to describe driving automation systems that can be classified at levels 3, 4,
and 5. The ADS consists of the hardware and software elements that distinguish AVs
from human-driven vehicles. ADSs are automotive technologies that allow vehicles to
engage in self-driving under specific conditions without any input from the driver [68].
An important benefit of such a system is the potential for drivers to engage in non-
driving-related tasks (NDRTs) such as online activities (e.g., texting, checking their
email, or surfing the web) [24, 25, 32, 71]. Along with the potential safety benefits,
the increase in productivity through NDRTs is often cited as a relevant motivation
behind the adoption of ADSs [35,88,94].
Trust in the ADS—i.e., the willingness of the driver (or passenger) to be vulnera-
ble to the actions of the ADS—is essential if the driver is to leverage the opportunity
to accomplish any NDRT [92]. Drivers must trust the ADS to feel comfortable dis-
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engaging from the driving and focusing on the NDRT. Drivers who do not trust the
ADS enough are less likely to hand over the driving to the ADS and fully disengage
from the driving, shifting their attention to the NDRT. The lack of trust limits one’s
ability to fully engage in the NDRT. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that there has
been extensive research on promoting drivers’ trust in ADSs [3, 12,78].
Advances have been made in understanding both the promotion of ADS trust and
its impact on NDRT performance, but the influence of risk on that impact remains
understudied. This is especially problematic as researchers readily admit that the use
of ADSs is often accompanied by some level of risk [63, 97, 110]. Risk is defined as
the degree of uncertainty associated with a given outcome [100], and is an important
factor in trust-related phenomena because it has been found to determine whether or
not trust translates into actual trusting behaviors [19,46,70]. Surprisingly, not much
work has been directed at understanding the role of risk in ADS trust development
and its impacts on drivers’ trusting behaviors. Motivated by this lack of knowledge,
the first goal of this dissertation is to provide analyses on the influence of internal
and external risk factors on ADS trust and corresponding trusting behaviors. These
analyses are presented in Chapter III, which is based on [10].
1.1.2 How to Estimate Drivers’ Trust in AVs?
Trust is a highly abstract concept, and this abstractness makes measuring (or
estimating) trust a challenging task [67]. Popular measures of trust are typically
self-reported Likert scales based on subjective ratings. For example, individuals are
usually asked to rate their degree of trust on a scale ranging from 1 to 7 [16, 43, 81].
Although self-reports are a direct way to estimate trust, they have several limitations.
First, self-reporting is affected by peoples’ individual biases, which makes a precise
trust quantification hard to achieve [95]. Second, it is difficult to obtain repeated and
updated estimates of trust over time without stopping or at least interrupting the
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task or activity someone is engaged in [23, 136]. Specifically, it is not reasonable to
expect ADSs to repeatedly interrupt drivers and ask them to complete a trust survey.
As such, self-reported trust estimates are not an approach that can be relied on to
assess drivers’ trust in real-time.
In Chapter IV, this dissertation proposes an alternative approach to estimat-
ing drivers’ trust by observing drivers’ real-time actions and behaviors. The pro-
posed method overcomes the limitations of previously published trust estimation ap-
proaches. For instance, those approaches fail to provide trust estimates in scales
traditionally used for trust in automation [1], or require prohibitive sophisticated
sensing and perception methods [1, 72]. Those approaches are also considered overly
complex, as they include the processing of psychophysiological signals (e.g., galvanic
skin response) that are not practical for the vehicular environments where driver-ADS
interactions take place. Considering the potential implications for ADS and the far-
reaching importance of trust to HRI research, the lack of robust methods for trust es-
timation is a significant gap to be filled. Especially in the case of self-driving vehicles,
the ability to indirectly estimate trust opens several design possibilities, particularly
for adaptive ADSs capable of conforming to drivers’ trust levels and modifying their
own behaviors accordingly. For example, trust estimations could be used in solu-
tions for issues related to trust miscalibration—i.e., when drivers’ trust in the ADS
is not aligned with system’s actual capabilities or reliability levels [21, 60, 81]. This
possibility leads to the next high-level question to be addressed in this dissertation.
1.1.3 How to Influence and Calibrate Drivers’ Trust in AVs?
In the future, automated systems will be expected to become aware of humans’
trusting behaviors and to adapt their own behaviors, seeking to improve their inter-
action with humans [124]. One way to implement those adaptive capabilities is to
develop methods for trust management, which we consider to be a robot’s ability to
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estimate and, if needed, to re-calibrate a human’s trust in that robot. Trust calibra-
tion has recently become an important topic in human-robot interaction [21]. Recent
calls have been made to better understand the problems associated with overtrust-
ing and undertrusting automation and robots [107, 117]. In particular, the use of
ADSs has been consistently plagued by problems associated with overtrusting and
undertrusting automated capabilities.
Trust miscalibration is defined as a mismatch between a human’s trust in an
automated system and the capabilities of that system [59, 81]. Trust miscalibration
is characterized by overtrusting or undertrusting an automated system, and it can
harm the performances associated with the use of that system. Overtrusting an
automated system can lead to misuse, where the human user relies on the system
to handle tasks that exceed its capabilities. Undertrusting an automated system
can lead to disuse, where the human fails to leverage the system’s capabilities fully.
Proper trust management can avoid both misuse and disuse of the automated system
by estimating and, if needed, influencing the human’s trust in the system to avoid
trust miscalibration.
The ability to manage trust and avoid miscalibration is especially crucial for au-
tomated systems that can put people’s lives at risk, such as AVs. Either misuse or
disuse of an AV is a risk to the performance and safety of the team formed by the
driver and the AV. Considering the current technology race in the automotive indus-
try for AV development [125], AVs that can manage drivers’ trust are a significant—if
not urgent—demand.
In the driver–AV interaction context, the goal of trust calibration is to align the
driver’s trust to appropriate levels through a trust influence mechanism, for instance,
by adapting the communication between the AV and the driver. The challenge of
designing a trust calibrator, however, has not received as much attention from re-
searchers. This research gap motivates the implementation of a trust management
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system based on a trust calibrator that is presented in detail in Chapter V.
1.1.4 How to use trust to assign tasks between a human and an automated
system?
Trust pervades people’s relationships with other people, with organizations, and
with machines [11,60,69,82]. Trust relationships usually involve two types of agents:
the trustor (the one who trusts) and the trustee (the one to be trusted). Trust
depends on both the trustor’s and the trustee’s characteristics and is revealed when
the trustor takes the risk of being vulnerable to the trustee’s actions [69].
Researchers from the HRI field have proposed predictive trust models that try to
capture how a human trustor develops trust in a robotic trustee [115, 132, 137]. A
perspective that is generally overlooked, however, is how trust from a robotic trustor
should develop over interactions with a trustee agent. This dissertation distinguishes
between human trust, also called natural trust, from robotic trust, also called artifi-
cial trust. Therefore, current trust models are focused on natural trust and are useful
for trust-aware decision-making, which requires the robot to estimate the human’s
trust in the robot to plan actions in a HRI setting. For example, trust-based par-
tially observable Markov decision processes (POMDP) have been used by robots to
plan actions while processing their human teammate’s trust in applications involving
robotic manipulation [17] and automated vehicles (AV) route planning [111].
Nonetheless, existing trust models have several shortcomings that hinder their
ability to predict humans’ natural trust and limit their application for robots’ artifi-
cial trust computation. First, current trust models are limited in their ability to char-
acterize the tasks that should be executed by trustees. Tasks must be characterized
in terms of what capabilities and which proficiency levels (in those capabilities) are
required from trustees to execute those tasks. For instance, driving requires certain
levels of cognitive, sensory and physical capabilities from drivers [2]. Second, current
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I HAVE ALREADY SEEN MY TEAMMATE
EXECUTING TASKS HARDER THAN       . 
I TRUST HER TO DO IT:
I HAVE NEVER EXECUTED A TASK AS
HARD AS       . MAYBE I COULD, BUT MY 
TEAMMATE MAY NOT TRUST ME TO DO IT:
HUMAN
ROBOT
Figure 1.2: A team formed by human H and a robot R that collaborate executing
tasks sequentially. Each task must be executed by one of the agents. The joint
decision on which agent should execute each task depends on comparisons between
the human’s trust in the robot and the robot’s trust in the human. A bi-directional
trust model can be used for predicting a human’s trust in a robot to execute a task,
and to predict how much humans can be trusted to execute a task.
trust models also fall short of describing the trustee agents in terms of their proven
capabilities. Trustees’ capabilities characterization and quantification are important
because,when a trustor knows that the trustee can (or can not) supply the types and
levels of capabilities that a task demands, the trustor’s trust in the trustee to execute
that task is higher (or lower). Finally, because of a lack of trustee capabilities char-
acterizations, current trust models are applicable for natural trust, or understanding
human trust in a robot, but not for artificial trust, or determining how a robot
should trust a human. Existing models are performance-centric and ignore “non-
performance” trustees’ factors, which are needed for artificial trust. To accommodate
both natural and artificial trust in (human or robotic) trustees, a computational trust
model must consider assessments of a trustee’s non-performance capabilities, such as
benevolence or integrity levels [69]. Therefore, although being sufficient for planning
algorithms, existing trust models can not be used in more sophisticated control au-
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thority allocation applications, which are likely to be based on comparisons between
the human’s trust in the robot and the robot’s trust in the human [8], such as it
would be needed in the situation represented in Figure 1.2. With this motivation,
Chapter VI focuses on the development of a bi-directional trust model that can be
used both for estimating a human’s natural trust in a robotic system and a robotic
system’s (such as an ADS) artificial trust in a human (such as a vehicle driver).
1.2 Contributions
This section describes the main contributions of this dissertation.
1. Investigation and characterization of how risk factors affect drivers’ trust in
ADSs
The study presented in Chapter III had two goals: first, to examine the impact
of two types of risk—namely, internal and external risk—on ADS trust; second,
to examine whether either type of risk weakens the impact of ADS trust on
trusting behaviors such as ADS monitoring and NDRT performance.
Results of that study showed that internal risk (low reliability ADS) reduces
ADS trust but that external risk (low visibility) does not. In addition, internal
risk moderated the positive impact that ADS trust had on NDRT performance.
The positive impact of trust on NDRT performance was more prominent when
the ADS was reliable (low internal risk). Moreover, external risk was found to
moderate the impact of ADS trust on driver monitoring. ADS trust decreased
monitoring when visibility was high (low risk) but not when visibility was low
(high risk).
The first contribution of this dissertation is the characterization of the role of
risk in understanding the impacts of ADS trust on drivers’ trusting behaviors.
That contribution is represented by the conclusions of the study presented in
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Chapter III, which can be summarized as follows. First, the specific type of
risk (i.e., internal vs. external) matters. Only internal risk had a significant
negative impact on ADS trust, while external risk had no significant impact
on ADS trust. Therefore, future studies on considering risk and ADS trust
should be careful to articulate the particular type of risk they are examining.
Second, the moderating effects of internal and external risks on the impact of
ADS trust on trusting behaviors such as driver monitoring and NDRT perfor-
mance are demonstrated. High internal risk, which was represented by a faulty
ADS, diminished the expected increase in performance when ADS trust is high,
which indicates the occurrence of overtrust in driver-ADS interactions. Exter-
nal risk, which was represented by severely foggy weather, prevented drivers
from reducing their ADS monitoring, even when those drivers reported high
ADS trust.
2. Development of a method for real-time drivers’ ADS trust estimation
As mentioned in Subsection 1.1.2, keeping track of drivers’ trust in ADSs in
real-time without directly asking drivers to report their trust levels is crucial
but challenging. To address this gap, this dissertation proposes a framework
for estimating drivers’ trust in ADSs in real-time, presented in Chapter IV.
The proposed trust estimator is the second contribution of this dissertation,
and is based on observable measures of drivers’ behaviors and trust dynamic
models. Although different trust estimation approaches have been previously
reported in the literature [1,72], the proposed trust estimation method is simpler
to implement. The proposed trust estimator represents trust in a continuous
numerical scale, which is consistent with Muir’s scale [83] and, therefore, also
consistent with the theoretical background on trust in automation. Moreover,
the proposed estimation framework relies on a discrete, linear time-invariant
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(LTI) state-space dynamic model and on a Kalman filter-based estimation al-
gorithm. This formulation makes the proposed trust estimation framework
appropriate for treating the unpredictability that characterizes drivers’ behav-
iors and for the design of innovative trust controllers. The trust estimator is
intended to provide a means for the self-driving vehicle’s ADS to track drivers’
trust levels over time. It enables tracking drivers’ trust levels without the need
for directly requesting drivers to provide self-reports, which can be disruptive
and impractical [67].
3. Development of a method for drivers’ ADS trust calibration
Chapter V presents the design of a trust calibration method, which is combined
with the trust estimator to structure a framework for managing trust in AVs.
The proposed trust calibrator is the third contribution of this dissertation,
and focuses on how to re-calibrate drivers’ trust after a trust miscalibration has
been identified. The trust calibrator identifies trust miscalibration issues from
the comparison of trust estimates with the capabilities of the AV and adjusts
how the AV communicates with the driver. It compares the AV’s capabilities
with the driver’s trust estimates to identify trust miscalibrations, and modifies
the interactive behavior of the AV accordingly. The AV is the element that
directly interacts with the drivers, providing verbal messages intended to influ-
ence drivers’ trust in the AV, as illustrated in Figure 1.3. The trust calibrator is
validated with a user study that shows that the proposed management frame-
work was successful in its intent, being able to increase trust levels when drivers
undertrusted the system and to decrease trust levels when drivers overtrusted
the system.
4. Development of a bi-directional trust model
Dynamic task allocation problems can benefit from the development and appli-
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Don't worry about driving, 
you can trust me! 
Focus on your other task!
Figure 1.3: An undertrusting driver is encouraged by the AV system simulator to focus
on his non-driving-related task (NDRT), to increase his trust level. An analogous
situation would take place if the driver overtrusted the AV’s capabilities, with the
system then demanding his attention to the driving task.
cation of a bi-directional trust model able to accommodate both human’s trust
and robotic system’s trust in (human or robotic) agents. This dissertation pro-
poses a unified bi-directional trust model that characterizes tasks to be executed
by potential trustee agents on a set of standard capability requirements. Then,
trustee agents’ capability profiles are built based on those trustee’s performance
on tasks they have executed previously. Trust is represented by the probability
that an agent can successfully execute a task, considering that agent’s capability
profile (built after observations). By considering both the agent’s capabilities
and the task requirements, the proposed bi-directional model is applicable for
determining a robot’s artificial trust in a trustee agent. Moreover, the model
can also be used for predicting trust transfer between tasks, similar to the model
proposed in [115]. Chapter VI presents the development of this model, which
was validated in a human subjects online experiment which resulted in a dataset
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relating trust and task capabilities measurements. Therefore, the fourth con-
tribution of this dissertation is the development of a new trust model that (i)
can be used for the artificial trust computation and (ii) outperforms existing
models for multi-task natural trust transfer prediction.
1.3 Dissertation Overview
This dissertation explores how trust can be used in the solutions of problems
that are relevant in the human-robot interaction context (or, more specifically, in the
driver-ADS interaction context). Chapter II presents an overview of the literature
on trust, with a focus on the details that are important for answering the four mo-
tivating questions presented in Section 1.1. Chapter III goes deeper into identifying
factors that affect drivers’ trust in ADSs (ADS trust), focusing on the impacts of risk
on ADS trust and on the relationships between trust and trusting behaviors. Chap-
ter IV presents a method for real-time trust estimation in vehicular environments
that considers and processes the driver’s behaviors that reflect ADS trust. Chapter V
leverages the trust estimation method from the previous chapter and presents a new
framework for trust management combining trust estimation and a method for trust
calibration. Chapter VI describes a novel model for bi-directional trust that can cap-
ture both natural and artificial trust (i.e., trust from a human trustor and trust from
a robotic trustor), and that can be applied not only for the driver-ADS interaction
context but also for a more general human-robot interaction context. Finally, Chap-





This chapter presents an overview of trust in human-robot interactions, with a
special focus on the particular case where the robot is a vehicle equipped with an
automated driving system and the human drives the vehicle when necessary. Four
main directions, characterizing the theoretical background in the key research topics of
this dissertation, are discussed. Section 2.1 presents the literature relative to drivers’
trust in automated driving systems, and its relation with drivers’ risk perception and
drivers’ behaviors that reflect their trust (trusting behaviors). Section 2.2 focuses
on trust estimation and Section 2.3 focuses on trust calibration, presenting relevant
works that investigate how to measure and manage trust in real-time applications.
Section 2.4 describes the recent research advances on trust computational models that
are used in human-robot interaction applications and allow robots to reason about
their human counterpart’s trust levels and use trust to improve their collaboration.
2.1 Risk and Trust in Automated Driving Systems
2.1.1 ADS Trust and Trusting Behaviors
Trust has been conceptualized and utilized across different domains of research.
Examples include user interface design for automotive applications [76, 85]; human
factors and ergonomics [54, 83, 104]; and human–robot interaction [16, 34]. In this
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dissertation, we consider ADS trust to be the willingness of the driver to be vulnerable
to the actions of the ADS. More specifically, ADS actions represent the system’s ability
to drive the vehicle and to alert the driver about hazards that require the driver to take
control. This “willingness to be vulnerable” is based on the drivers’ attitude that the
ADS in question will help them achieve their goals [54,92]. Trust is history-dependent
and contingent upon drivers’ prior knowledge about the capabilities and limitations
of the ADS [49]. Reliance, differently from trust, occurs when drivers willingly cede
control to the ADS [63]. ADS trust is vital for understanding when drivers will or
will not rely on the ADS. A recent study [57] investigated ADS trust and reliance
with six participants riding in a real-world self-driving vehicle. That study found that
participants failed to fully trust the ADS even after 6 days of riding. In this regard,
the ceding of control, as well as the degree of disengagement from the driving, can
both be considered trusting behaviors [29,121,128].
Too much ADS trust is also a situation to be avoided. Overtrust occurs when
the driver’s ADS trust exceeds the ADS’s capabilities. Trust is important because it
influences drivers’ behaviors directly, affecting their propensity to monitor the system
and their ability to execute an NDRT [52]. Overtrust, however, leads to a higher
chance that automation errors will go unnoticed and result in more accidents [79,89].
To avoid this, drivers need to calibrate their ADS trust, aligning it with the system’s
capability [49,87].
ADSs allow drivers to disengage from driving and engage in NDRTs safely. In the
absence of ADSs, NDRTs are viewed as distractions that can lead to accidents [28].
However, the ability to engage in NDRTs by allowing the ADS to drive is increasingly
viewed as a benefit [92,94,113]. As a result, researchers have been exploring the factors
that promote better NDRT performance [53, 92]. For example, one such study [53]
focused on selecting the most effective vehicle interface to support NDRTs.
Driver performance on NDRTs can be considered a trusting behavior induced
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by ADS trust. However, the NDRTs must be carefully designed and meet specific
requirements for NDRT performance to reflect trust. In general, the NDRT can not
be as easy as to permit a high frequency switching between the NDRT the driving
task—it must reach the driver’s attention resources capacity. Additionally, the NDRT
must be structurally similar to the driving task to increase multi-tasking difficulty.
As suggested by multiple resources theory [127], tasks do not necessarily compete for
a single pool of demand-sensitive resources. Therefore, if the NDRT has structural
differences as compared to driving, and loads different attentional resource modalities
(e.g., auditory instead of visual), the driver’s ability to multi-task is higher. In that
case, time-sharing can become more efficient, and the driver can achieve high NDRT
performance without the intrinsic necessity to trust the AV because s/he will be able
to execute both tasks at the same time easily. Therefore, the visual search NDRT is
appropriate for ADS trust studies because it forces the sharing of the driver’s visual
attention, which is the primary resource required from the driver for safely operating
the vehicle.
Other trusting behaviors can be observed and measured with the use of eye-
tracking technology. Eye-movement recordings indicate where a person’s attention is
being directed, with the fixation durations indicating the amount of processing at the
point of regard. Fixations indicate moments when the eyes are relatively stationary,
taking in or “encoding” information. In an encoding task, higher fixation frequency
indicates greater interest in a particular area of interest (AOI). Other eye-tracking
metrics can also indicate different variables, such as: (i) saccades, which indicate quick
eye movements occurring between fixations and measure processing difficulty dur-
ing encoding; (ii) scanpaths, defined by complete saccade-fixation-saccade sequences,
which indicates the efficiency of visual search; or (iii) blink rate; and (iv) pupil size,
both indicating cognitive workload levels. In particular, gaze measurements, defined
as the sum of fixation durations within an AOI, are helpful to compare attention
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between target regions. In our driver-AV interaction context, drivers must split their
visual attention resources between the NDRT and the driving task. For this reason,
we use gaze measurements—defined in Chapters III, IV and V as NDRT focus—as
an indicative of drivers’ trust in the ADS.
Several studies have found that ADS trust increases NDRT performance [52, 94,
116]. The logic is simple: the more drivers trust the ADS, the more they focus on the
NDRT; in turn, the better they perform on the NDRT [92]. Recently, Petersen et al.
found that when drivers were provided with contextual information, increasing their
situational awareness, ADS trust had a strong positive impact on NDRT performance
[92]. In another example [40], Helldin et al. investigated the impact of uncertainty on
trust and takeover speed. They found that drivers who were provided with a better
understanding of the automation’s abilities performed better on NDRTs. Similarly,
Körber et al. found that participants with higher trust in automation spent more
time on their NDRT and less time looking at the road—also confirming the trusting
behaviors previously described [52]. In summary, the literature has demonstrated a
strong and positive impact of ADS trust on NDRT performance.
2.1.2 ADS Trust and Risk
Scholars agree that risk is fundamental to understanding trust but most have
focused on the direct relationship between risk and trust. Zhang et al. found a
significant negative correlation between risk and trust [138]. They classify risk into
two classes, namely safety risk and privacy risk. They defined safety risk as the
possibility of accidents and physical harm from a system malfunction, while privacy
risk originated from the possibility that travel or behavioral data could be transmitted
to other parties, such as the government, vehicle developers, and insurance companies
without notice, or even be used against the users or be hacked by others. Notably,
they found that the negative correlation between risk and trust was significant only for
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safety risk and not for privacy risk. A study conducted by Verbene et al. found that
ADS trust also increased when risk was reduced [121]. Yet, other works have focused
on understanding when risk reduced ADS trust [37, 63]. For example, Gremillion et
al. found that when the ADS performed poorly, drivers’ trust decreased and they
relied less on the automation [37]. Conversely, when the ADS performed well, drivers’
trust increased and drivers relied more on the ADS.
The classical integrative model of organizational trust by Mayer, Davis, and
Schoorman also highlighted the potential moderating role of risk between trust and
trusting behaviors [70]. The perceived risk associated with a given outcome deter-
mined whether trust led an individual to engage in trusting behaviors. In their trust
model, the impact of trust on trusting behaviors was stronger when more risk was
associated with an outcome. This was empirically verified in the context of virtual
teams by Robert, Denis, and Hung [100]. They verified that higher risk involved in
a given situation led to a stronger correlation between trust and trusting behavior.
In the context of ADSs, Liu, Yang and Xu examined the relationship between risk
and ADS trust [66]. Similar to other studies, they found that perceived risk had a
negative relationship with trust. However, unlike other studies, they called attention
to the complexity of the interactions between risk and trust. More specifically, they
called for more research to better understand and model how risk and ADS trust
interact with each other.
Although the research summarized here is valuable, more is needed, as pointed
out in [66]. The literature on trust suggests that risk is vital to understanding trust
impacts. This dissertation seeks to add to the literature by examining whether risk
undermines the impacts of ADS trust. Without a better understanding of risk in
the context of ADS trust, researchers and designers lack insight into an important
mechanism needed to design ADSs. Chapter III focuses on the relationships between
two types of risk (internal and external) on three important outcomes: ADS trust,
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NDRT performance, and ADS monitoring.
2.2 Modeling and Estimating Trust in ADSs
2.2.1 Trust in Automation and Trust in Robots
Trust in automation has been discussed by researchers since it was first identified
as a vital factor in supervisory control systems [112]. Formal definitions of trust in
machines came from interpersonal trust theories [11,96] and were established by Muir
in the late eighties [81]. Muir identified the need to avoid miscalibrations of trust in
decision aids “so that [the user] neither underestimates nor overestimates its capabili-
ties” [81]. Her work was then extended by Lee and Moray, who used an autoregressive
moving average vector form (ARMAV) analysis to derive a transfer function for trust
in a simulated semi-automatic pasteurization plant [58]. The inputs for this model
were system performance (based on the plant’s efficiency) and faults. They later fo-
cused on function allocation problems, and found that the difference between trust
and self-confidence is crucial for users to define their allocation strategies [59].
The theoretical background on trust in automation has formed the basis for the
development of more specific trust in robots measurement scales. Schaefer developed a
scale that relies on the assessment of forty trust items, related to the human, the robot,
and the environment where they operate [105]. Yagoda [134] created a measurement
scale considering military applications and defining a list of HRI-related dimensions
suggested by experts with extensive experience in the field. Charalambous et al.
gathered qualitative trust-related questions focusing on the industrial human-robot
collaboration (HRC) niche and developed a trust measurement scale for that specific
context [15].
In this dissertation, and especially in Chapter IV and Chapter V, we consider the
widely accepted definition of trust as “the attitude that an agent will help achieve an
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individual’s goals in a situation characterized by uncertainty and vulnerability” [60].
This definition aligns with Muir’s standard questionnaire for trust self-reporting,
which we used for trust quantification. Trust in automation is distinct from re-
liance on automation. Trust is an attitude that influences human’s reliance behavior,
characterized by engaging in automation usage. Trust miscalibrations are likely to
induce inappropriate reliance, such as automation misuse or disuse [60].
2.2.2 Trust Dynamics and Estimation
Castelfranchi and Falcone [14] define the main aspects of trust dynamics as: how
do the experiences of the trustor agent (both positive and negative experiences) influ-
ence trust changes; and how the instantaneous level of trust influences its subsequent
change. These aspects are especially important when a human agent (in this case, the
trustor) interacts with a machine (i.e., the trustee). As in a dynamic system, trust
evolution is assumed to depend on the trust condition at a time instance and on the
following inputs represented by the trustor’s experiences with the trustee [58]. Sev-
eral works have considered these basic assumptions and presented different approaches
for trust dynamics modeling. The argument-based probabilistic trust (APT) model
establishes the representation of trust as the probability of a reliable action, given
the situation and system features [20]. In the reliance model, reliance is considered
a behavior that is influenced by trust [60]. The three-layer hierarchical model de-
scribes trust as a result of dispositional, situational and learned factors involved in
the human-automation interaction [43].
A relevant approach for modeling the dynamics of trust is that of Hu et al. [45],
who developed a linear state-space model for the probability of trust responses within
two possible choices: trust or distrust in a virtual obstacle detection system. In ad-
dition to developing trust-related dynamic models, researchers have used different
psychophysiological signals to estimate trust. For instance, extending Hu’s work [45],
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Akash et al. [1] proposed schemes for controlling users’ trust levels, applying elec-
troencephalography and galvanic skin response measurements for trust estimation.
However, psychophysiology-based methods suffer from at least two drawbacks. First
and foremost, when using the reported psychophysiological methods, trust is not di-
rectly measured. Rather, the results of that method are conditional probabilities of
achieving two states (trust or distrust), given prior signal patterns. Although this
is a reasonable approach, previous research suggests that trust should be directly
measured and represented in a continuous scale [15, 48, 83, 105]. Second, the sensor
apparatus applied in psychophysiology-based methods is intrusive and can influence
users’ performance negatively, bringing practical implementation issues in applica-
tions such as self-driving vehicles.
The work presented in this dissertation, especially in Chapter IV, differs from
previous research in two ways. First, a model that has trust as a continuous state
variable is proposed. In this model, trust is defined in a numerical scale consistent
with Muir’s subjective scale [83]. Second, a simpler trust sensing method is presented.
This method relies only on eye-tracking as a direct measure of drivers’ behavior. Other
variables that are used for sensing are intrinsic to the integration between ADS and
the non-driving-related task (NDRT) executed by the driver.
2.2.3 System Malfunctions impact on Trust Dynamics
When not working properly, machines that are used to identify and diagnose haz-
ardous situations—which might trigger human intervention—can present two distinct
malfunction types: false alarms and misses [118]. On the one hand, false alarms occur
when the system wrongfully diagnoses nonexistent hazards. On the other hand, when
the system can not identify the existence of a hazard and no alarm is raised, a miss
occurs. These different error types influence system users differently [4, 74, 75, 139],
and also have distinct impacts on trust. The influence of false alarms and misses
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on operators’ behaviors was investigated by Dixon et al. [27], who has established a
relationship with users compliance and reliance behaviors. After being exposed to
false alarms, users reduced their compliance behavior, delaying their response to or
even ignoring alerts from the system (the “cry wolf” effect). On the contrary, after
misses, users allocated more attention to the task environment [26,126,129].
It is clear that false alarms and misses represent experiences that influence drivers’
trust in ADSs. As systems that are designed to switch vehicle control with the
driver in specific situations, ADSs rely on collision sensors that monitor the environ-
ment to make the decision to request drivers’ intervention. Therefore, while other
performance-related factors—such as the ADS’s driving styles [13] or failures on dif-
ferent components of the ADS—could affect drivers’ trust, we consider that those
collision sensors were the most relevant and safety critical elements in SAE level 3
ADSs. In Chapter IV, we introduce system malfunctions only in the form of false
alarms and misses on the simulated vehicle’s collision warning system, while keeping
other factors such as the vehicle’s driving style and other failure types unchanged
and generally acceptable: the vehicle followed the standard speed of the road, and no
other type of system failure occurred.
2.3 Trust Calibration
Trust calibration is as important as trust estimation and plays a fundamental role
for the management of trust in driver-ADS interaction (or human-robot, in general).
People’s trust in an automated system must be well calibrated, which means it has to
be aligned with the system’s capabilities. Miscalibrated trust is likely to lead to the
inappropriate use of the system and accidents [7, 51, 55, 65]. However, the evolution
of automated systems into autonomous robots with powerful sensing technologies
has paved the way for new trust calibration strategies. Researchers have proposed
strategies for autonomous robotic systems to try to perceive and process humans’
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trust, and modify their own behaviors to influence humans’ trust when necessary [7,17,
111]. Current trust-aware autonomous robotics systems are indicative that traditional
concepts related to trust in automation are evolving and being reexamined by the
HRI community. In Chapter V, the objective of trust calibration is to manipulate
drivers’ trust in the AV for aligning trust with the AV’s capabilities (i.e., avoiding
trust miscalibration). Several studies have identified factors that significantly impact
trust in AVs, and, therefore, could be used for trust manipulation purposes. The
most important of these factors are situation awareness and risk perception, which are
influenced by the ability of the AV to interact with the driver. For instance, enhancing
drivers’ situation awareness facilitates increased trust in AVs [92, 93]. On the other
hand, increasing drivers’ perception of risk reduces their trust in AVs [4, 94, 139].
The trust management framework proposed in Chapter V takes advantage of these
studies’ results, and seeks to influence trust by varying situation awareness and risk
perception through verbal communications from the AV to the driver.
2.4 Bi-Directional Trust
2.4.1 Utilitarian Trust Definition
Several trust definitions have been proposed, generally pointing to the trustor’s
willingness to be vulnerable to the trustee’s actions [60, 69]. In this work, we con-
sider Lee’s trust definition [60]. However, Kok and Soh have recently proposed the
following (adapted) definition for trust: “given a trustor agent A and a trustee agent
B, A’s trust in B is a multidimensional latent variable that mediates the relation-
ship between events in the past and A’s subsequent choice of relying on B in an
uncertain environment” [51]. In Chapter VI, we adopt this utilitarian view of trust,
which is aligned with a focus on the trustor-trustee pair [69] history of interactions,
and is useful for the development of human-robot collaboration planning and control
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methods.
2.4.2 Trust Computational Models
In robotics applications, the main goal behind the development of trust models
is to give a robot the ability to estimate its human counterpart’s trust (in that same
robot). Trust models are usually applied to determine how much a human trusts a
robot to perform a task (such as in Figure 1.2, when the robot R is chosen to execute
a task). The robot uses this estimate of human trust to predict the human’s behavior,
such as intervening and taking over the task execution. For example, trust models
are used in different trust-aware POMDP-based algorithms that have been proposed
for robotic planning and decision-making [16,61,111]. Their objective is to eventually
improve the robot’s collaboration with the human, using human trust as a vital factor
when planning the robot’s actions.
Planning and decision-making frameworks usually rely on the use of probabilistic
models for trust, such as those proposed in [33, 38, 132]. Xu and Dudek proposed an
online probabilistic trust inference model for human-robot collaborations (OPTIMo)
that uses a dynamic Bayesian network (DBN) combined with a linear Gaussian model,
and recursively reduces the uncertainty around the human operator’s trust. OPTIMo
was tested in a human–unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) collaboration setting [132]
and, although some dynamic models had been proposed before [23,58], OPTIMo was
the first trust model capable of tracking human’s trust in a robot with low latency
and relatively high accuracy. The UAV, with OPTIMo, was able to track the human
operator’s trust by observing how much the human intervened in the UAV’s operation.
There have been other Bayesian models proposed since OPTIMo. These models
include personalized trust models that apply inference over a history of robot perfor-
mances, such as [33] and [38]. Mahani et al. proposed a model for trust in a swarm of
UAVs, establishing a baseline for human-multi-robot interaction trust prediction [33].
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Guo and Yang have improved trust prediction accuracy (as compared to Lee’s AR-
MAV model [58] and OPTIMo [132]) by proposing a formulation that describes trust
in terms of Beta probability distributions and aligns the inference processes with trust
formation and evolution processes [38].
Although all previously mentioned approaches for trust modeling represented im-
portant advances in how we understand and describe humans’ trust in robots, they
suffer from a common limitation. Those models depend on the history of robots’ per-
formances on unique specific tasks, and are not applicable for trust transfer between
two different tasks. The issue of multi-task trust transfer was recently approached by
Soh et al. [115], who proposed Gaussian Processes and neural methods for predicting
the transferred trust among different tasks that were described with NLP-based text
embeddings. One goal of the bi-directional trust model proposed in Chapter VI is to
deepen that discussion and improve prediction accuracy for multi-task trust transfer
by: (i) describing tasks in terms of capability requirements, and (ii) describing poten-
tial trustee agents in terms of their proven capabilities that can be used to transfer
trust to another task.
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CHAPTER III
Trust in Automated Driving Systems, Risk and
Driver Trusting Behaviors
3.1 Introduction
Automated driving systems (ADSs) allow vehicles to engage in self-driving under
specific conditions. Along with the potential safety benefits, the increase in pro-
ductivity through non-driving-related tasks (NDRTs) is often cited as a motivation
behind the adoption of ADSs. Although advances have been made in understanding
both the promotion of ADS trust and its impact on NDRT performance, the influ-
ence of risk remains largely understudied. This chapter presents a within-subjects
experiment conducted to fill that gap. A total of 37 licensed drivers used a simulator
where internal risk was manipulated by ADS reliability and external risk by visibility,
producing a 2 (ADS reliability) × 2 (visibility) design. The results indicate that high
reliability increases ADS trust and further enhances the positive impact of ADS trust
on NDRT performance, while low visibility reduces the negative impact of ADS trust
on driver monitoring. Results also suggest that trust increases over time if the system
is reliable and that visibility did not have a significant impact on ADS trust. These
findings are important for the design of intelligent ADSs that can respond to drivers’
trusting behaviors.
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This chapter is based on the work published in [10]. The remainder of the chap-
ter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents a research framework, describing
hypotheses about the relationship between risk, ADS trust and trusting behaviors.
Section 3.3 describes the methodology applied for the experiment that was designed
to validate the hypotheses. Section 3.4 presents the results obtained in the experi-
ment. Section 3.5 discusses the main findings of the study and how these findings fit
in the literature on ADS trust and risk. Section 3.6 highlights the main limitations of
the study presented, while Section 3.7 summarizes its conclusions and contributions.
3.2 Study on ADS Trust and Risk
Based primarily on the relationship between risk and trust, several hypotheses
were developed in the context of an ADS and a driver performing an NDRT. The ADS
is designed to support NDRTs by providing the driver with semi-autonomous driving
capability and recommendations based on the current driving situation. The system
is considered a Level 3 ADS, in accordance with the classification defined in the SAE
J3016 standard [101], because: (i) the simulated vehicle can drive conditionally under
specific situations, (ii) the driver is a fallback-ready user of the vehicle, receptive to
ADS-issued requests to intervene, and able to take control and drive when necessary,
and (iii) the system can issue a request for the driver to intervene. The ADS’s
recommendations are designed to help the driver know when she or he has to disengage
from the NDRT and take over the driving from the ADS. Drivers also have the option
to monitor the driving situation themselves and determine when they should take over
the driving independent of the ADS’s recommendations. We hypothesize about the
implications associated with: (i) reducing the ADS’s reliability by having it provide
incorrect recommendations and (ii) reducing the visibility in the driving situation by
providing foggy weather.
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3.2.1 Risk and ADS Trust
Based on prior ADS literature [37, 66, 121, 138], it is hypothesized that increases
in either internal or external risk (i.e., reduced reliability or visibility) should reduce
ADS trust for several reasons. For internal risk, the reduced reliability should inher-
ently decrease the level of trust someone has in the ADS, i.e., a less reliable ADS
is a less capable ADS. In this case, less reliable means an ADS that provides incor-
rect recommendations on when the driver should take over the driving. Therefore,
drivers who receive incorrect recommendations would be likely to view the ADS as
less capable. This would reduce their expectations about the system’s ability, hence
reducing ADS trust. For external risk, reduced visibility increases the difficulty of
the driving situation. In our case, we used foggy weather to reduce visibility, which
might cast doubt on the ADS’s ability to make correct recommendations (on when
the driver should take over). As visibility decreases, drivers should be less likely to
believe that the ADS can assess the situation and make correct recommendations.
Taken together, increases in both internal and external risks in the form of a less
reliable ADS and less visibility should decrease the driver’s trust in the ADS.
Hypothesis 1: Low ADS reliability reduces ADS trust.
Hypothesis 2: Low visibility reduces ADS trust.
3.2.2 Risk, ADS Trust and NDRT Performance
Internal risk should moderate the impact of ADS trust on NDRT performance.
Based on prior literature, when internal risk is low, we should expect increases in
ADS trust to lead to better NDRT performance [52, 94, 116]. The more the drivers
trust the ADS, the more they can engage in the NDRT and disengage from driving. A
reliable ADS provides the driver with correct recommendations, helping the driver to
make good decisions. This explains the positive link between ADS trust and NDRT
performance [94]. However, when internal risk is high, we should expect increases
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in ADS trust to have little impact on NDRT performance. Trusting an unreliable
ADS can actually have negative consequences for the driver. An unreliable ADS
provides incorrect recommendations, causing the driver to make poor decisions. As
such, increases in ADS trust should be less likely to directly translate to better NDRT
performance.
Hypothesis 3: ADS reliability moderates the impact of ADS trust on
NDRT performance in the following ways:
• When ADS reliability is high, ADS trust increases NDRT performance.
• When ADS reliability is low, ADS trust has little or no impact on NDRT
performance.
External risk should also moderate the impact of ADS trust on NDRT perfor-
mance. More specifically, low visibility should reduce the impact of ADS trust on
NDRT performance. When visibility is low, drivers are likely to engage in monitoring
irrespective of their trust in the ADS. Drivers attempt to double-check the driving
situation even with the information provided by the ADS. Overall, this choice is likely
to weaken the potential impact of ADS trust on NDRT performance. However, when
visibility is high, drivers are more likely to rely on the ADS to sense the environ-
ment and drive safely. Therefore, when external risk is low, higher ADS trust should
translate into better NDRT performance. When external risk becomes evident to the
drivers, they do not achieve their best NDRT performance, even when they report-
edly trust the ADS. In all, trusting an ADS when visibility is high is likely to have
positive consequences for the driver, and less so when visibility is low.
Hypothesis 4: Low visibility due to foggy weather moderates the impact
of ADS trust on NDRT performance in the following ways:
• When visibility is high, ADS trust increases NDRT performance.
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• When visibility is low, ADS trust has little or no impact on NDRT perfor-
mance.
3.2.3 Risk, ADS Trust and Monitoring
Internal risk should moderate the impact of ADS trust on monitoring. Based on
prior literature, when internal risk is low we should expect increases in ADS trust
to decrease the driver’s monitoring of the driving situation [41, 46, 52, 70]. The more
drivers trust the ADS, the more likely they will be to focus on the NDRT and refrain
from monitoring the driving themselves. However, when the ADS is unreliable, drivers
are likely to engage in monitoring irrespective of their level of trust in the ADS. When
this occurs, ADS trust should not reduce the degree of monitoring. Thus, increases in
ADS trust should reduce monitoring when internal risk is low but not when internal
risk is high.
Hypothesis 5: ADS reliability moderates the impact of ADS trust on
monitoring in the following ways:
• When ADS reliability is high, ADS trust decreases monitoring.
• When ADS reliability is low, ADS trust has little or no impact on monitoring.
External risk should also moderate the impact of ADS trust on monitoring. Dur-
ing driving conditions of high visibility, ADS trust should reduce monitoring. When
visibility is high, drivers are more likely to trust and rely on the ADS than to engage
in their own monitoring of the driving situation. This explains the negative impact of
ADS trust on monitoring. However, similarly to Hypothesis 4, when visibility is low,
drivers are more likely to monitor irrespective of their ADS trust. As stated previ-
ously, drivers will double-check the driving situation over and above the information
provided to them by the ADS. Although this might not be a wise decision relative
to NDRT performance, drivers are likely to monitor the driving situation regardless
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of their reported trust in the ADS. Therefore, trust in the ADS would not decrease
monitoring. In sum, trusting an ADS should be likely to reduce monitoring when
visibility is high but not when visibility is low.
Hypothesis 6: Low visibility (due to foggy weather) moderates the im-
pact of ADS trust on monitoring in the following ways:
• When visibility is high, ADS trust decreases monitoring.
• When visibility is low, ADS trust has little or no impact on monitoring.
Figure 3.1 presents our research framework, indicating the impacts of one factor
on the other and representing pictorially the hypotheses with the labels H1, H2, H3,












H1 & H2 H3 & H4 H5 & H6
Figure 3.1: Research framework considered in this study. We hypothesized that risks
reduce drivers’ trust in the ADS. Moreover, ADS trust elicits trusting behaviors
and promotes better NDRT performance. However, this relationship should be
influenced by the risks involved in the context. ADS = automated driving system;




We recruited a total of 37 licensed drivers from the Ann Arbor, MI area to partici-
pate in the experiment. Participants were recruited via email advertising and printed
posters. They were then directed to a website for eligibility screening. This screening
required all participants to:
• be older than age 18,
• be a licensed driver,
• not be colorblind,
• have normal or corrected-to-normal vision (with contact lenses only–eye glasses
were not allowed because they would interfere with the eye-tracker),
• have normal or corrected-to-normal auditory acuity,
• have no history of disorders or injuries that could affect their ability to use the
simulator,
• not be military or civilian Department of Defense employees, and
• not have participated in the study before.
Participants’ average age was 22.5 years (standard deviation [SD]=3.6 years),
including 11 women, 25 men, and 1 participant who chose not to specify gender.
3.3.2 Experimental Tasks
3.3.2.1 Driving task
The primary task for the participants was to drive the simulated vehicle on the
road with help from the ADS, while avoiding any collisions. The ADS provided
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the following features to the driver: automatic lane-keeping, cruise control, forward
collision alarm, and emergency braking. However, the vehicle was not able to switch
lanes by itself. Participants could switch between AUTO mode (i.e., when the ADS
was in charge of driving) and MANUAL mode (i.e., the participant was in charge of
driving) at any point if they desired. The forward collision alarm was the only feature
that did not work correctly in the unreliable ADS condition. The participants had to
take active control to switch lanes and avoid hitting obstacle vehicles along the road.
Figure 3.2 provides an example of the driving environment.
Figure 3.2: Driving task: to drive a vehicle on a highway and avoid the obstacles,
with lane-keeping and alert assistance from the automated driving system.
Occasionally, the simulated vehicle alerted the participant that an upcoming
parked vehicle was standing on the lane ahead. The alert system issued audible
alarms. Alarms sounded two verbal messages: “stopped vehicle ahead,”, displayed
approximately 6.5 s before reaching a stopped vehicle, followed by “take control now,”
which sounded 5 s before reaching the obstacle. In those situations, if the partici-
pants did not take control in time, the emergency brake was triggered and prevented
the collision. Participants received 10 alerts, representing 10 events per trial. In the
unreliable ADS condition, these alerts were false alarms in three of the 10 events.
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Figure 3.3 presents a typical order of events in a trial.
... ...
Figure 3.3: Timeline for one trial. Participants experienced all four trial conditions.
Each trial had 10 alerts that could be true or false alarms. When the alert t was
true, FA(t) = 0. When it was a false alarm, FA(t) = 1. Drivers were free to take over
control at any time.
3.3.2.2 Non-driving-related task (NDRT)
The NDRT consisted of a modified version of the Psychology Experiment Build-
ing Language (PEBL) visual search task [119]. PEBL is a standard tool used by
psychologists and social scientists to design and run behavioral tests [80]. In this
task, participants used a touchscreen to repeatedly locate and select a target char-
acter (i.e., a “Q”) that were placed among distractor characters (i.e., “O”s). Each
time the participants correctly located and selected the target, they earned 1 point.
Figure 3.4 provides a screenshot of the NDRT. As shown in Figure 3.5, the NDRT
screen was positioned in a way to force the driver to choose between engaging in the
34
NRDT or monitoring the driving but not both. Additionally, each time the emergency
stop was triggered to prevent a collision, drivers were penalized. The performance of
the participants, represented by their final scores in the NDRT minus any penalties,
was recorded for compensation purposes and to decide who was eligible to receive a
monetary bonus. Participants received $15 and a cash bonus based on their perfor-
mance. We promised a $5 bonus to the best performers under each risk condition,
which encouraged participants to perform well in all four trials. Therefore, the NDRT
functioned as a means of motivating participants to rely on the ADS. By doing so,
participants were able to focus more on the NDRT and possibly receive the cash
bonus. In addition, the loss of points from an emergency stop (and the consequent
costs of losing cash bonuses) gave the participants a concrete sense of risk.
Figure 3.4: Non-driving-related task (NDRT): Visual search task where the partici-
pant had to find and point to the target “Q” among the “O”s. Each time participants
correctly selected the target, they earned 1 point on their NDRT score. A penalty of
25 points was deducted from the NDRT score for each time the emergency stop was
triggered. (The actual task did not show the red arrow.)
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3.3.2.3 Apparatus
The simulator was composed of 3 LCD monitors integrated with a Logitech G-27
driving kit. A smaller touchscreen monitor was positioned at the right hand for the
NDRT (see Figure 3.5).
Figure 3.5: Experiment setup. The driving task was implemented with the Auto-
mated Navigation Virtual Environment Laboratory, or ANVEL [30]; the non-driving-
related task (NDRT) was implemented with the Psychology Experiment Building
Language, or PEBL [119]; Pupil Lab’s Mobileye headset was the eye-tracker device
used.
We developed the simulation with the Automated Navigation Virtual Environ-
ment Laboratory [30]. The console was placed to face the central monitoring screen
so as to create a driving experience as close as possible to that of a real vehicle. For
the eye-tracking device, we used Pupil Lab’s Mobileye headset equipped with a fixed
“world camera.” This device acquired gaze positional data from participants’ eyes as
well as videos of the participants’ fields of view and eye orientations.
3.3.3 Experimental Design
We employed a 2 × 2 within-subject design varying both the reliability of the
automated driving system (ADS) and the visibility in the simulated environment.
The ADS reliability was represented by two conditions: reliable (or perfect), when
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the automation did not make any mistakes, and unreliable (or imperfect), when the
automation gave some false alarms to the driver. The visibility was manipulated by
two simulated weather conditions: clear or foggy. All conditions of the 2 × 2 design
were experienced by all subjects.
ADS reliability and visibility were the two independent variables we manipulated
to establish the 2×2 design. As stated, we manipulated the ADS reliability to assume
two possible levels, represented by the reliable ADS × unreliable ADS conditions.
We manipulated the reliability of the ADS by including false alarms. False alarms
occurred when the ADS warned the driver of an obstacle on the road but, in fact,
no obstacle was present. False alarms were the only system failures included in
the simulation to manipulate the degree of ADS reliability. In the unreliable ADS
conditions, false alarms occurred three times out of the ten alarms given to the driver
per trial. In contrast, in the reliable ADS conditions, all ten alarms were correct.
This percentage of false alarms (30%) is consistent with the prior literature [62, 94].
We also manipulated the simulated weather conditions to vary visibility in two
levels. In clear weather, the high visibility permitted drivers to spot an obstacle
1, 000 ft (≈ 305 m) away, while the low visibility caused by foggy weather reduced this
distance to 500 ft (≈ 152 m). The speed of the vehicle was regulated to 70 mph (≈ 113
km/h). Therefore, in terms of time to reach the obstacle, those distances represented
time gaps of approximately 9.8 s in high visibility and 4.9 s in low visibility. The
choice of visibility as a variable to represent the level of external risk involved in the
driving context is consistent with prior literature. Low visibility levels have been
found to increase the likelihood of rear-end collisions [135]. In addition, [56] found
that users associated ADS risk with system errors or accidental events, rather than
with psychological factors such as self-efficacy or ease of use, providing further support
for both of this study’s manipulations.
To introduce a notation that will be useful for the analyses of results, the binary
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Boolean variables Rel and Vis were defined. These variables respectively represent
the levels of ADS reliability and of visibility conditions in Equations (3.1) and (3.2).
Rel =
 0 if the ADS is 70% reliable (unreliable ADS), and1 if the ADS is 100% reliable (reliable ADS). (3.1)
Vis =
 0 if the visibility is low (foggy weather), and1 if the visibility is high (clear weather). (3.2)
In this study, Rel and Vis were static indicators in the sense that they did not
vary during each trial. These variables represented the trial conditions and were set
right before the start of each of the four trials experienced by the participants.
For the analysis of the evolution of some variables over the 10 alerts of each
trial, a sequence FA(t) was defined. FA(t) = 0 indicated that the ADS alarms worked
properly at the alert t and, conversely, FA(t) = 1 indicated that a false alarm occurred
at the alert t, t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 10}.
3.3.4 Measures
The following dependent variables were measured: (a) post-trial trust, (b) alert-
wise dynamic trust, (c) risk perception variables, (d) final NDRT performance score,
and (e) alert-wise dynamic monitoring ratio.
a) Post-trial trust, represented by Tpost, was the numerical average of the an-
swers to questions contained in the survey given to the participants after each trial
(reproduced in Appendix A).
b) We also defined an alert-wise dynamic trust variable T (t), which was computed
with the increases or decreases in trust after each and every alert, including the false
alarms (i.e., those for which FA(t) = 1). During the trial, subjects were asked after
each ADS alert about their trust change, with the options of {decreased, no change,
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increased}. The simulation was paused for some seconds while they answered the trust
change question at the same tablet device they used for the NDRT. Their responses
were translated to a quantized trust difference ∆T (t) ∈ {−1, 0, 1} respectively, for
each event t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 10}.
To keep consistency between the post-trial trust and the dynamic trust, T (t) is






∆T (i), for t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 9}, and
Tpost, for t = 10.
(3.3)
Note that we defined T (0) as the computed trust at the beginning of the trial,
before any ADS alert. We chose the scaling factor γ = 0.4 to avoid negative values
for the dynamic trust variable T (t). To make sure that our findings would hold for
different coefficients, we also computed the results for γ = 0.2, 0.3, and 0.5. All results
involving the dynamic trust variable were consistent with the conclusions presented
in section 3.4 for these γ coefficients.
c) Risk perceptions, represented by perceived reliability risk Relperc and per-
ceived visibility risk Visperc, were also measured through standard surveys adapted
from [100]. These can be found in Appendix A. These variables were used for a ma-
nipulation check, where we evaluated the participants’ perception of how different
were the risk conditions that they had experienced in each trial.
d) NDRT score (SNDRT ) was computed from each participant’s total score ob-
tained on the search task in each trial, where each correctly chosen “Q” was worth 1
point, and each emergency stop penalty deducted 25 points from the total.
e) Alert-wise dynamic monitoring ratio, represented by rm(t), was computed from
the eye-tracking data to represent the eye movement properties [41]. When the par-
ticipants switched their attention between the driving task and the NDRT, their gaze
generally moved from the center monitor to the touchscreen and vice versa. Monitor-
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ing ratio rm(t) was defined as the amount of time spent by the participant looking at
the road (on the simulator monitors) during a time interval between the alerts t− 1
and t, divided by this time interval.
All variables and their respective basic details are summarized in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Variable names and interpretations. Presented variables are extracted from
experiment data and are used for linear mixed-effects models in the Results section.
Variable Interpretation Type Set/Range
Rel Reliability Independent {0, 1}
Vis Visibility Independent {0, 1}
FA(t) False alarm at alert t Independent {0, 1}
Relperc Perceived reliability risk Dependent [1, 7]
Visperc Perceived visibility risk Dependent [1, 7]
Tpost Post trial trust score Dependent [1, 7]
T (t) Alert-wise dynamic trust score Dependent [0.2, 8.6] ?
SNDRT Post-trial NDRT performance score Dependent {100, ..., 227} ?
rm(t) Alert-wise dynamic monitoring ratio Dependent [0, 100%]
?
Note: “?” denoted values observed from the data set. NDRT = non-driving-
related-task.
3.3.5 Experimental Procedure
Upon arrival, participants signed a consent form to participate in the study. Next,
participants completed a pre-experiment survey about demographics and their experi-
ence using driving assistance systems. This survey included questions about their risk
tolerance and propensity to trust automated systems in general. Then, participants
had a training session where they interacted with the simulator and performed the
NDRT. The training drive allowed participants to become familiar with the simulator
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and the NDRT prior to the four experimental conditions.
After the training session, participants were equipped with an eye-tracking head-
set, which was then calibrated. QR codes on each monitor allowed the eye-tracking
software to determine which screen the participant was looking at. Next, the eye-
tracking device was set up and participants started the first of the four trials. We
counterbalanced the order of the trials to minimize any learning or ordering effects.
For each trial, participants were tasked with both driving and performing the NDRT
(described in subsection 3.3.2 Experimental Tasks). Participants were instructed to
engage the automated driving mode as soon as they felt comfortable and start the
NDRT, but not to totally neglect the driving (as the vehicle would ask them to
take control). It took approximately 10 min for a participant to complete each trial.
Finally, after each trial, participants completed a post-trial survey about their risk
and trust perceptions. Participants were free to ask the experimenter for clarifications
about the post-trial survey at any time. This survey used questions adapted from [83]
(see Appendix A for the questions). After completing all four trials, participants were
debriefed and received their compensation.
3.3.6 Analysis
We used linear mixed-effects (LME) models [131] to investigate the relationships
among risk, trust, NDRT performance and monitoring ratios. The objective was to
identify the parameters (represented by β) that significantly differed from 0 in each
model. When β is significantly different from zero, we can consider that the associated





We conducted a manipulation check for risk. We compared Relperc and Visperc
between treatments with pairwise t-tests to determine whether the level of perceived
risk differed significantly at the α = 0.001 likelihood level. Table 3.2 shows that the
means under each condition were significantly different from one another. Based on
these results, we concluded that the manipulation was successful.
Table 3.2: Manipulation check for risk conditions.
Treatment Condition Perceived Reliability/Visibility Difference p-value
Low ADS Reliability
(Rel = 0)










Note. ADS = automated driving system; NDRT = non-driving-related-task; Rel =
reliability; Relperc = perceived reliability; Vis = visibility; Visperc = perceived visibility;
Relperc and Visperc range: 1 to 7; ** p < 0.01.
3.4.2 Hypotheses Verification
The outcomes of the experiment were compared with our hypotheses, in order to
validate them or not. The results are divided in three parts, directly linked to each
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pair of hypotheses.
3.4.2.1 H1 and H2 – Impacts of risk on automated driving system (ADS)
trust
To analyze the impacts of low reliability and low visibility on ADS trust, we
built models considering both the post-trial trust Tpost and the dynamic trust T (t) as
output variables.
For Tpost, we fit the data to the model represented by Equation (3.4),
Tpost = βI + βRelRel + βVisVis + ε , (3.4)
where the obtained parameters and their respective significance values are presented
in Table 3.3. As shown, ADS reliability significantly increased ADS trust, while
visibility from the different weather conditions did not, thus supporting H1 but not
H2.
Table 3.3: Parameters for the linear mixed-effects model of post-trial trust (Tpost),
with main effects for the independent variables Rel and Vis .
Factor affecting Tpost, Equation (3.4) Coefficient S.E. p-value
[Intercept] βI = 4.88 0.18 1.05× 10−40 **
Reliability (Rel) βRel = 1.09 0.14 1.60× 10−11 **
Visibility (Vis) βVis = −0.06 0.14 0.65
Note. S.E. = standard error; ** p < 0.01.
Similarly, for the dynamic trust T (t), we built the model represented by Equation
(3.5),
T (t) = βI + βT (t−1)T (t− 1) + βRelRel + βVisVis + ε , (3.5)
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to understand the influences caused by each risk type on the evolution of trust during a
whole trial, considering the sequence of events indicated by t. In this model, however,
we also considered the parameter βT (t−1), associated with the “one alert” delayed trust
measurement T (t − 1). The parameters and their respective p-values are presented
in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: Parameters for the linear mixed-effects model of dynamic trust, or T (t),
with main effects for the delayed trust measure T (t − 1) and for the independent
variables Rel and Vis .
Factor affecting T (t), Equation
(3.5)
Coefficient S.E. p-value
[Intercept] βI = 0.274 0.034 2.48× 10−14 **
Dynamic (delayed) trust T (t− 1) βT (t−1) = 0.9597 6.1× 10−3 1.46× 10−39 **
Reliability (Rel) βRel = 0.083 0.013 1.12× 10−10 **
Visibility (Vis) βVis = −0.024 0.012 0.036 *
Note. S.E. = standard error; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01.
The parameters from Table 3.4 show that ADS reliability has a significant effect
on trust dynamics, and affects trust’s evolution over time. Visibility’s effect is also
significant at the α = 0.05 likelihood level. In summary, from the models represented
by Equations (3.4) and (3.5) as well as their parameters, we observed that high ADS
reliability had a significant positive impact on ADS trust. Visibility had a significant
positive impact on Visperc and a significant negative impact on dynamic ADS trust,
as shown in Table 3.4 and Equation (3.5). However, visibility did not have an impact
on post trial ADS trust, as shown in Table 3.3 and Equation (3.4). Therefore, our
first hypothesis was partially supported by our results.
These results are illustrated in Figures 3.6 and 3.7. Figure 3.6 presents the sim-
ulation of the model represented by Equation (3.5). For that simulation, we have
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considered the initial condition T (0) = 4, which is the midpoint of the 7-point Likert
scale. The use of a reliable ADS (Rel = 1) results in a faster increase in trust, while
a low ADS reliability (Rel = 0) slows this evolution.
On the other hand, Figure 3.7 shows the average behavior for T (t), considering
the response data of all participants, for the different treatment conditions. The
curves for which Rel = 1 follow the same pattern, indicating a solid trust increase
over the usage time of a reliable ADS. Furthermore, the final values for T (10), which
corresponds to Tpost, are not significantly different, both being close to 5.9 points. In
low-reliability conditions (Rel = 0), the curves indicate decreases for specific alert
indexes t, coincident with the false alarms provided by the ADS. That is, for Rel = 0
and Vis = 1, we had false alarms for t = 3, 4, 6 while for Rel = 0 and Vis = 0, false
alarms occurred for t = 2, 4, 5. Moreover, for both low ADS reliability conditions, the
average value of T (10) = Tpost was about 4.8.








Trust Evolution Over Alerts by Reliability Level
Figure 3.6: Curves illustrate the simulation of the model represented by Equation
(3.5). We chose T (0) = 4 for both conditions to better compare the results. When
Rel = 1 (i.e., when participants were using a reliable ADS), trust increased faster
than when Rel = 0 (i.e., when participants were using an unreliable ADS). For both
curves, Vis = 0.
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Figure 3.7: Plots of the average T (t) for all participants for each reliability and
visibility condition. When Rel = 1 (i.e., when participants were using a reliable
ADS), T (t) increased steadily over the alerts indicated by t. When Rel = 0 (i.e.,
when participants were using an unreliable ADS), the occurrence of false alarms
resulted in decrements in T (t). This happened for t = 2, 4, 5 when Vis = 0 and for
t = 3, 4, 6 when Vis = 1. For these t, FA(t) = 1.
3.4.2.2 H3 and H4 – Influence of risk on the impacts of ADS trust on
non-driving-related task (NDRT) performance
The second pair of hypotheses asserted that both low reliability and low visibility
should moderate the impact of ADS trust on NDRT performance. This claim was only
partially supported by our results, as we concluded by analyzing the model expressed
in Equation (3.6) and its parameters listed in Table 3.5.
SNDRT = βI + βTpostTpost + βRelRel + βVisVis + βTpost×Rel[Tpost ×Rel]
+ βTpost×V is[Tpost × V is] + βRel×V is[Rel × V is] + ε.
(3.6)
From the significant positive value for βTpost×Rel, we concluded that ADS reliability
moderates the impact of ADS trust on NDRT performance (H3). The moderating
effect of visibility represented by βTpost×V is was not significant (H4).
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Table 3.5: Non-driving-related task score (SNDRT ) linear mixed-effects model param-
eters, with main effects for the post-trial average trust measure Tpost and for the
independent variables Rel and Vis , as well as their interaction effects. The interac-
tion effects represent the moderating influence on the impacts of ADS trust on NDRT
performance.
Factor affecting SNDRT , Equation (3.6) Coefficient S.E. p-value
[Intercept] βI = 191 14 9.44× 10−25 **
Post-trial Trust Tpost βTpost = 3.1 2.7 0.25
Reliability Rel βRel = −39 19 0.045
Visibility Vis βVis = −4 15 0.785
Interaction Tpost × Rel βTpost×Rel = 7.3 3.2 0.028 *
Interaction Tpost × Vis βTpost×Vis = 1.7 3.1 0.58
Interaction Rel × Vis βRel×Vis = −20.8 7.6 0.008 **
Note. SNDRT = non-driving-related task score; S.E. = standard error; * p < 0.05; **
p < 0.01.
Figure 3.8 represents the relationship corresponding to the results demonstrated
by Equation (3.6) and its parameters (Table 3.5). With low reliability, the weaker
slopes indicate that a higher ADS trust level did not result in a significantly better
NDRT performance. When using a reliable ADS, however, the greater slope indicates
that a higher trust corresponded to better performance.
3.4.2.3 H5 and H6 – Influence of risk on the impacts of ADS trust on
monitoring ratio
H5 and H6 state that both low ADS reliability and low visibility should moderate
the impact of ADS trust on monitoring ratio. These hypotheses are also partially
supported by the model that relates rm(t) with the variables T (t− 1), Rel and Vis ,
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Figure 3.8: Correspondence between Tpost and respective SNDRT deviations around
the mean. Here, the mean value for Tpost is around µ = 5.4, and the standard deviation
is approximately σ = 1.3. The interval between one standard deviation above and
below the mean (µ± σ) is considered. The mean values for SNDRT were all brought
together at zero, for the comparison of slopes. For all conditions where Rel = 1,
the slope is greater than when Rel = 0. Therefore, when using an unreliable ADS,
participants could not translate a higher ADS trust level into significantly better
NDRT performance. Visibility does not influence this relationship significantly. ADS
= automated driving system; NDRT = non-driving-related task; Rel = reliability;
Vis = visibility; SNDRT = non-driving-related task score.
as we concluded from Equation (3.7) and its parameters (shown in Table 3.6). The
use of T (t−1) is justified because rm(t) was measured during the time period between
alerts indexed by t−1 and t. Thus, we computed the impact of the trust responses on
monitoring ratios measured right after the participants were asked about their trust
changes.
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rm(t) = βI + βT (t−1)T (t− 1) + βRelRel + βVisV is+ βT (t−1)×Rel[T (t− 1)×Rel]
+ βT (t−1)×V is[T (t− 1)× V is] + βRel×V is[Rel × V is] + ε.
(3.7)
Table 3.6: Monitoring ratio (rm(t)) linear mixed-effects model parameters, with main
effects for the delayed trust measure T (t − 1) and for the independent variables Rel
and Vis , as well as their interaction effects. The interaction effects represent the
moderating influence on the impacts of automated driving system trust on monitoring
ratio.
Factor affecting rm(t), Equation
(3.7)
Coefficient S.E. p-value
[Intercept] βI = 0.403 0.074 1.25× 10−7 **
Dynamic (delayed) Trust T (t− 1) βT (t−1) = 0.006 0.017 0.72
Reliability indicator Rel βRel = 0.013 0.095 0.89
Visibility indicator Vis βVis = 0.144 0.084 0.086
Interaction T (t− 1)×Rel βT (t−1)×Rel = −0.004 0.018 0.83
Interaction T (t− 1)× V is βT (t−1)×V is = −0.041 0.018 0.025 *
Interaction Rel × V is βRel×V is = 0.038 0.048 0.42
Note. S.E. = standard error; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01.
The value of βI = 0.403 in Table 3.6 indicates an average basic monitoring ratio
for the participants, specifically when disregarding the impacts of trust and when
Rel = Vis = 0. The results from Table 3.6 also show that monitoring ratio is
negatively correlated with the interaction between T (t − 1) and Vis . That is, with
high visibility (i.e., in clear weather conditions), the subjects trusted the ADS more,
looked at the road less and focused on the secondary task more. However, under
low visibility (i.e., foggy weather), such impact of trust was greatly reduced and
monitoring ratio was no longer an effective trusting behavior. Reliability, however,
had no significant impact on rm(t), nor did it moderate the impact of T (t − 1) on
rm(t). These results corroborate H6 but not H5.
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The relationship between T (t − 1) and rm(t) indicated by Equation (3.7) is il-
lustrated in Figure 3.9, which summarizes all combinations of Vis and Rel . The
figure shows that better visibility enabled a decrease in monitoring ratios when par-
ticipants reported higher ADS trust. This is represented by the negative slopes when
Vis = 1. Contrarily, when Vis = 0, this correlation became irrelevant, with the slope
parameter assuming the value βT (t−1) = 0.006, but with no significance.








Figure 3.9: Correspondence between dynamic trust T (t) and respective rm(t) devi-
ations around the mean. Here, the mean value for T (t) is around µ = 4.9, and the
standard deviation is approximately σ = 1.3. The interval between one standard devi-
ation above and below the mean (µ±σ) is considered, and the mean values for rm(t)
were all brought together to zero, for the comparison of slopes. For all conditions
where Vis = 1, the slope was negative, which did not happen when Vis = 0. The
result shows that for Vis = 1, higher trust led to smaller monitoring ratios. In other
words, high visibility allowed drivers to demonstrate their ADS trust by reducing sys-
tem monitoring. However, when the visibility conditions were poor (Vis = 0), drivers
did not decrease monitoring, even when they reported having higher ADS trust. ADS




The goals of this chapter were: (i) to investigate how different types of risk in-
fluence automated driving system (ADS) trust development, and (ii) to understand
when different risk types undermine or strengthen the impact of automated driv-
ing system (ADS) trust on both non-driving-related task (NDRT) performance and
monitoring ratio. Results of this study can be organized around three overarching
findings. First, the use of an unreliable ADS reduced ADS trust (H1 supported), but
foggy weather with low visibility did not (H2 not supported). This is consistent with
what is shown in Figure 3.7, that on average trust increases over time if the system is
reliable. Second, the use of an unreliable ADS moderated the positive impact of ADS
trust on non-driving-related task (NDRT) performance (H3 supported), while low
visibility did not (H4 not supported). Third, low visibility moderated the impact of
ADS trust on monitoring (supporting H6), but low reliability did not (not supporting
H5). Next, we discuss our contributions to the literature.
First, the findings here presented contribute to the cumulative research on the
antecedents of ADS trust. Our first major finding is that the type of risk is important
when understanding its effects on ADS trust. Research has suggested that, as risk
increases, ADS trust decreases [37,121]. Since our manipulation check results confirm
that our scenarios did induce higher perceptions of reliability and visibility (Table 3.2),
our findings are consistent with prior literature for internal risk, represented by low
reliability, but are not consistent with regards to external risk, represented by low
visibility. Only low reliability resulted in lower ADS trust. Thus, our results extend
the existing literature by demonstrating the distinct impacts of internal and external
risks. Before [10], no studies had specifically distinguished between risk types and
considered their influence on ADS trust.
Second, this study contributes to the literature by clarifying the boundary condi-
tions on the impact of ADS trust on NDRT performance. A large body of research
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has focused on the positive impacts of ADS trust on NDRT performance [52,92,116].
Our research extends prior work by showing when ADS trust is not likely to lead
to better NDRT performance. Results of our study show that the positive impact
of ADS trust on NDRT performance also depends on risk, and particularly on the
type of risk. Our results are consistent with prior work when the ADS was working
perfectly.
However, for an unreliable ADS, ADS trust had little or no impact on NDRT
performance. External risk (represented by low visibility) did not significantly affect
the relationship between trust and NDRT performance. Given our findings on the
influence of risk in this relationship, we conclude that a highly reliable system is crucial
for higher ADS trust to result in improved NDRT performance, whereas the visibility
conditions in the environment are less important. These findings are novel because
the existing literature has not explored the effects of risk from different sources on
the impacts of ADS trust on NDRT performance.
Third, this study contributes to the literature by identifying the role of risk on
the impact of ADS trust on monitoring. Specifically, this study found that the re-
lationship between ADS trust and monitoring ratio also depends the type of risk.
Prior research on ADS trust and monitoring has typically found that ADS trust re-
duces monitoring [41,52]. When a driver trusts the ADS more, the driver spends less
time watching the road. Our results were consistent with these established results
only when there was high visibility in the environment. However, when the visibil-
ity was low because of severe fog, increases in ADS trust had almost no impact on
monitoring. Whether ADS trust leads to less monitoring depends on the visibility
levels; it does not depend on ADS reliability. Ironically, when drivers should be re-
lying on the ADS the most (i.e., in low-visibility conditions), they apparently are
not. These results were unexpected and provided a novel finding about the influences
of risk on the relationship between ADS trust levels and monitoring. These results
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also imply that an ADS that attempts to estimate the drivers’ trust level based on
the observed monitoring ratio cannot ignore the context presented by the external
visibility conditions.
Finally, this chapter contributes to the ADS trust literature and has practical
implications for the design of innovative ADS technologies. The relationships among
trust, risk, NDRT performance and trusting behaviors could be incorporated in a
trust estimation framework. As expected, our findings showed that unreliable ADSs
(e.g., false alarms) could reduce driver trust in the system. An ADS that is self-
aware when it has made a mistake might be able to explain to the driver what
happened and, if not re-gain the driver’s trust, at least help the driver to understand
the limitations of the ADS. Intelligent ADSs could sense monitoring and performance
and could benefit from our conclusions to estimate drivers’ ADS trust more accurately.
Our findings also indicate that monitoring ratio should be considered as a trusting
behavior only when the environmental conditions permit—i.e., when weather is clear
and visibility is high. Combining these trust estimates with sensed environmental
conditions, intelligent systems can decide how to act to manage a driver’s trust levels
appropriately, attempting to avoid both over-trust and under-trust [37] which can
both lead to serious problems.
3.6 Limitations and Future Research
The study presented in this chapter had several limitations. The first is related
to our experimental setup: we used a simulated driving environment instead of a real
vehicle. Participants could have different risk perceptions when an automated driving
system (ADS) error could lead to a life-threatening accident instead of a monetary
loss, and this could strengthen the relationships we found. Previous work has shown
that individuals respond similarly to real and simulated environments [42], but the
use of an actual vehicle in more realistic conditions could be the subject of future
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research efforts.
We also manipulated our risk conditions varying only one internal and one external
risk factor: ADS reliability and visibility according to weather conditions. ADS
designers are expected to be very conservative regarding safety and, because of that,
false alarms are more likely to be present in autonomous vehicles than misses. This
is the reason why, although not being safety-critical, false alarms were chosen to
represent flaws in system reliability in this work. However, to extend our conclusions,
future research might specifically investigate the impact of different types of both
internal and external risks. For internal risks, both false alarms and misses could be
considered. For external risks, an extension of this work could be the introduction of
rain or wet roads, not only reducing visibility but also affecting the ADS’s and the
driver’s abilities to operate the vehicle. In addition, we only varied two levels of ADS
reliability, 0 error or 30% error. However, future automated vehicles are expected to
have much lower failure rates than 30%. Therefore, it would be important for future
studies to consider examining the impact of lower error rates on ADS trust.
Another limitation is the demographic distribution of our participants. In our
study, subjects were relatively young and most were men. Therefore, we should be
cautious when expanding our conclusions to the general population. Additionally,
personal traits have shown to impact user’s trust in robots generally and automated
vehicles specifically [86, 98, 99]. Future studies could examine how user’s personality
traits may influence ADS trust in the presence of risk.
This study did not employ explanations from the ADS to help the driver un-
derstand why the ADS did or did not work properly. Prior research had employed
explanations as a means of promoting driver trust when unexpected events or actions
took place. That being said, it is not clear that any research has examined the im-
pacts of explanations relative to the effects of risk on trust. Future research could
investigate the ability of explanations from the ADS to reduce uncertainty and risk.
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In addition, such explanations can help drivers increase their ADS trust and predict
when the ADS may or may not work properly [29, 31, 49]. Prior research has shown
that drivers can still trust an unreliable ADS when they can predict when or why
it might fail. Future studies should consider including the impacts of the driver’s
knowledge of the system to provide additional insights into the influence of risk on
the impacts of ADS trust.
3.7 Conclusions and Contribution
In this chapter, we investigated how different risk types influence drivers’ trust in
automated driving systems (ADSs). We examined how risk moderates the impacts
of ADS trust on drivers’ trusting behaviors, and the impacts of ADS trust on their
performance in a secondary, non-driving-related task (NDRT). The study here pre-
sented considered two risk types: internal, represented by low ADS reliability; and
external, associated with low visibility from foggy weather. The three major findings
were: (1) The negative impact of risk on ADS trust depends on the type of risk
and, in particular, risks from external sources (such as foggy weather) did not have
a significant negative impact on ADS trust. (2) The positive impact of ADS trust
on NDRT performance depends not only on risk but also on the type of risk; for an
unreliable ADS, ADS trust had little or no impact on NDRT performance. (3) The
negative impact of ADS trust on monitoring ratio depends not only on risk, but also
on the type of risk. When the visibility was low because of severe fog, ADS trust had
almost no impact on monitoring ratio.
These findings characterize how risk factors affect drivers’ trust in ADSs and,
taken as a whole, represent the first main contribution of this dissertation. New ADS
studies can take these findings into consideration to better understand how drivers’
trust is related to their performance and behavior under different risk contexts. Risk
influences the evolution of drivers’ ADS trust and, ultimately, moderates their ability
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to rely completely on the system and perform tasks other than driving. With new
artificial intelligence and machine-learning-enabled technologies being able to identify
and classify complex information and different contexts, the perception and processing
of trust and risk are likely to become possible. Thus, a better understanding of how
these factors evolve and influence each other is fundamental for the design of future
intelligent ADSs.
Leveraging part of the knowledge obtained in this chapter, Chapter IV will present
a trust estimation method that is based on a linear model relating internal risk (i.e.,




Estimation of Drivers’ Trust in ADSs
4.1 Introduction
Trust miscalibrations, represented by undertrust and overtrust, hinder the inter-
action between drivers and self-driving vehicles. A modern challenge for automotive
engineers is to avoid these trust miscalibration issues through the development of
techniques for measuring drivers’ trust in the automated driving system during the
execution of real-time applications. One possible approach for measuring trust is
through modeling its dynamics and subsequently applying classical state estimation
methods. This chapter proposes a framework for modeling the dynamics of drivers’
trust in automated driving systems and also for estimating dynamic trust. The es-
timation method integrates sensed behaviors (from the driver) through a Kalman
filter-based approach. The sensed behaviors include eye-tracking signals, the usage
time of the system, and drivers’ performance on a non-driving-related task (NDRT).
A study (n = 80) with a simulated SAE level 3 automated driving system will be
presented, and the factors that impact drivers’ trust in the system will be analyzed.
Data from the user study are used for the identification of the trust model parame-
ters. Results will show that the proposed approach was successful in computing trust
estimates over successive interactions between the driver and the automated driving
system. These results encourage the use of strategies for modeling and estimating
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trust in automated driving systems. This trust measurement technique paves a path
for the design of trust-aware automated driving systems capable of changing their
behaviors to control drivers’ trust levels to mitigate both undertrust and overtrust.
This chapter is based on the work published in [6], and is organized in the following
sections. Section 4.2 briefly describes the trust estimation problem and Section 4.3
focuses on the methodology that was applied for its solution. Section 4.4 details the
user study conducted to validate the proposed method and the collected data from
that study. Section 4.5 analyzes the collected data and presents the trust estimation
results. Section 4.6 discusses the main contributions and implications of this new
trust estimation framework and its limitations and, finally, Section 4.7 concludes the
chapter.
4.2 Problem Statement
In this chapter, our main problem is to estimate drivers’ trust in ADS from drivers’
behaviors and actions in real-time while they operate a vehicle equipped with an SAE
Level 3 ADS and concurrently perform a visually demanding NDRT. Our method
must provide continuous trust estimates that can vary over time, capturing the dy-
namic nature of drivers’ trust in the ADS. The estimation method must avoid the
impractical process of repeatedly asking drivers their levels of trust in the ADS, and
be as unobtrusive as possible for sensing drivers’ behaviors and actions.
4.3 Method
4.3.1 Scope
To define the scope of our problem, we make the following assumptions about the
ADS and the driving situation:
1. the ADS explicitly interacts with the driver in events that occur during vehi-
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cle operation, and provides automated lane-keeping, cruise speed control, and
collision avoidance capabilities to the vehicle;
2. the NDRT device is integrated with the ADS, allowing the ADS to monitor
drivers’ NDRT performance. The ADS can also track driver’s head and eyes
orientations;
3. drivers can alternate between using and not using the driving automation func-
tions (i.e., the vehicle’s self-driving capabilities) at any time during the opera-
tion;
4. when not using the driving automation functions, drivers have to perform the
driving task, and therefore operate the vehicle in regular (non-automated) mode;
5. using the capabilities provided by the ADS, the vehicle autonomously drives
itself when the road is free, but it is not able to maneuver around obstacles (i.e.,
abandoned vehicles) on the road. Instead, the ADS warns the driver whenever
an obstacle is detected by the forward collision alarm system at a fair reaction
distance. In these situations, drivers must take over driving control from the
ADS and maneuver around the obstacle manually to avoid a collision; and
6. the forward collision alarm system is not perfectly reliable, meaning that both
false alarms and misses can occur, and the ADS acknowledges when these er-
rors occur. These false alarms and misses lead to interactions that are likely to
decrease drivers’ trust in the ADS. No other system malfunctions were imple-
mented in the simulation.
4.3.2 Solution Approach
Assuming that the variations of trust caused by the interactions between the driver
and the ADS can be quantified, we decide to apply a classical Kalman filter-based
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continuous state estimation approach for trust. There are three reasons for applying
a Kalman filter-based approach: (i) the fact that the continuous output measures
of the estimator could be useful for the design of controllers and decision making
algorithms in future applications; (ii) the aforementioned well-accepted practice of
using continuous numerical estimates for trust in automated systems; and (iii) the
difficulties related to the stochasticity of drivers’ behaviors, which can be mitigated
by the Kalman filter with recurring measurements. Therefore, to represent trust as
a state variable, we need the mathematical derivation of a state-space model that
represents the dynamics of trust. We assume that the dynamics of trust is influenced
by the trustor agents’ instantaneous level of trust and their experiences over time [14].
Those experiences are represented by interactions between the ADS and the driver
associated with the reliability (or internal risk) of the ADS forward collision alarm.
This assumption is an implication of Chapter III’s conclusion that only internal risk
affects ADS trust, while the external risk does not. Specifically, we consider that
true alarms indicate high reliability and are positive experiences for the driver, while
high internal risk manifestations given by false alarms and misses are negative driver
experiences.
The implementation of a Kalman filter requires the definition of observation vari-
ables that can be measured and processed in real-time. These observation variables
must be related to the variable to be estimated. Therefore, to satisfy the ease of
implementation requirements stated in Section 4.2, we select a set of variables that
were easy to sense and suitable for being used in a vehicular spatial configuration.
The variables are: (i) the amount of time drivers spent using the autonomous ca-
pabilities provided by the ADS, i.e., ADS usage time ratio; (ii) the relative amount
of time drivers spent focusing on a secondary task (the NDRT), measured with an
eye-tracker device, i.e., focus time ratio [67]; and (iii) drivers’ performance on that
same NDRT, i.e., NDRT performance. The focus time ratio obtained with the eye
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tracker is chosen because it is conveniently easy to be measured in a vehicle, and has
been shown to be successfully representative of trust metrics [67]. The other variables
are chosen because they are assumed to be proportional to trust: the more a driver
trusts an ADS, the more s/he will use it; the more a driver trusts the ADS, the better
s/he will perform on her/his NDRT.
Finally, to identify the parameters of a model for drivers’ trust in ADS, we need
to obtain a training dataset containing both inputs and their corresponding outputs.
The outputs must be represented by drivers’ true levels of trust in the ADS, which we
can obtain by collecting their self-reports in a controlled user experiment. Therefore,
only for the purpose of obtaining this training dataset, we establish a procedure for
asking drivers their levels of trust in the ADS.
4.3.3 Definitions
To implement our solution methodology, we must first define the terms that will
be used in our formulation.
Definition 1 (Trial)
A trial is concluded each time the driver operates the vehicle and reaches the end
of a predefined route.
Trials are characterized by their time intervals, limited by the instants they start
and end. Denoting these by t0 and tf , t0 < tf , the time interval of a trial is given by
[t0, tf ] ∈ R+.
Definition 2 (Event)
An event, indexed by k ∈ N \ {0}, is characterized each time the ADS warns or
fails to warn the driver about an obstacle on the road. Events occur at specific time
instances tk corresponding to k, t0 < · · · < tk < · · · < tf , when the ADS:
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1. correctly identifies an obstacle on the road and alerts the driver to take over
control;
2. provides a false alarm to the driver; or
3. misses an existent obstacle and does not warn the driver about it.
Definition 3 (Event Signals)
The event signals are booleans L(tk), F (tk) and M(tk) corresponding to the event
k that indicates whether the event was:
1. a true alarm, for which L(tk) = 1 and F (tk) = M(tk) = 0;
2. a false alarm, for which F (tk) = 1 and L(tk) = M(tk) = 0; or
3. a miss, for which M(tk) = 1 and L(tk) = F (tk) = 0.
Definition 4 (Instantaneous Trust in ADS)
Drivers’ instantaneous trust in ADS at the time instance t, t0 ≤ t ≤ tf is a scalar
quantity, denoted by T (t).
T (t) is computed from trust variation self-reports and from questionnaires an-
swered by the driver, adapted from the work by Muir and Moray [83]. We re-scale
the numerical range of the survey responses to constrain T (t) ∈ [Tmin, Tmax], and
arbitrarily choose Tmin = 0 and Tmax = 100. We also assume that T (t) is immutable
between two events, i.e., for tk ≤ t < tk+1. We consider T (t) to be our basis for the
development of the proposed trust estimator.
Definition 5 (Instantaneous Estimate of Trust in ADS)
The estimate of trust in ADS at the time instance t, t0 ≤ t ≤ tf is the output
of the trust estimator to be proposed, and is represented by T̂ (t). Its associated
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Figure 4.1: Timeline example for the stated problem. The event k−1 is a true alarm
(there is an obstacle car and the ADS warns the driver about it); the event k is a
false alarm (there is no car but the ADS also warns the driver); and the event k + 1
is a miss (there is an obstacle car and the ADS does not warn the driver about it).
Definition 6 (Focus)
Drivers’ focus on the NDRT, represented by ϕ(tk), is the percentage of time the
driver spends looking at the NDRT screen during the interval [tk, tk+1).
Definition 7 (ADS Usage)
Drivers’ ADS usage, represented by υ(tk), is defined by the percentage of time the
driver spends using the ADS self-driving capabilities during the interval [tk, tk+1).
Definition 8 (NDRT Performance)
Drivers’ NDRT performance, represented by π(tk), is the total points obtained by
the driver in the NDRT during the interval [tk, tk+1) divided by ∆tk = tk+1 − tk.
We also call ϕ(tk), υ(tk), and π(tk) our observation variables.
Figure 4.1 shows an example of a timeline scale that represents events within a
trial. The NDRT and its score policies are explained in Section 4.4.
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4.3.4 Trust Dynamics Model
To translate Castelfranchi’s and Falcone’s main aspects of trust dynamics [14]
into mathematical terms, we must represent the experiences of the trustor agent, the
subsequent change in trust, and relate those variables. Describing the user experiences
with the passing time and the event signals, while also considering their discrete
nature, we can expect a general relationship with the form represented by Equation
(4.1),
T (tk+1) = f(tk, T (tk), L(tk), F (tk),M(tk)) , (4.1)
where f : [t0, tf ]× [Tmin, Tmax]× {0, 1}3 → [Tmin, Tmax].
Additionally, we can expect the relationship between observations and trust to





 = h(tk, T (tk), L(tk), F (tk),M(tk)) , (4.2)
where h : [t0, tf ]× [Tmin, Tmax]× {0, 1}3 → [0, 1]2 × R.
For simplicity, we assume the functions f and h to be linear, time-invariant,
with additional random terms representing drivers’ individual biases. Moreover, we
model trust and the observation variables as Gaussian variables, and consider the
observations to be independent of the event signals and within each other, representing
the dynamics of trust in the ADS with the LTI system state-space model in Equations
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(4.3), 

























u(tk) ∼ N (0, σ2u) and w(tk) ∼ N (0,Σw).
4.3.5 Trust Estimator Design
The state-space structure permits the application of Kalman filter-based tech-
niques for the estimator design. We then propose the procedure presented in Algo-
rithm 1. Figure 4.2 shows a block diagram representation of this framework, high-
lighting the trust estimator role in the interaction between the driver and the ADS.
4.4 User Study and Data Collection
We reproduced the situation characterized in Section 4.3 with the use of an ADS
simulator. A total of 80 participants were recruited (aged 18-51, M = 25.0, SD = 5.7,
52 male, 26 female and 2 who preferred not to specify their genders). Participants were
recruited via email and printed poster advertising. All regulatory ethical precautions
were taken. The research was reviewed and approved by the University of Michigan’s
Institutional Review Board (IRB).
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Algorithm 1 Trust Estimator
1: procedure Trust Estimation(T̂ (tk), Σ̂T (tk),
L(tk), F (tk),M(tk), ϕ(tk), υ(tk), π(tk))
2: if k = 0 then




4: Σ̂T (t0)← 1 . Initializes trust estimate and co-variance
5: else













9: T (tk)← T̂ (tk) +Kv
10: ΣT (tk)← Σ̂T (tk)−KCΣ̂T (tk)
11: T̂ (tk+1)← AT (tk) + B
L(tk)F (tk)
M(tk)
 . Time Update
12: Σ̂T (tk+1)← AΣT (tk)A> + σu
13: end if
14: return T̂ (tk+1), Σ̂T (tk+1)
15: end procedure
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Figure 4.2: Block diagram representing the trust estimation framework. The event
signals L, F , and M indicate the occurrence of a true alarm, a false alarm, or a miss.
The observations ϕ, υ and π represent the drivers’ behaviors. T is drivers’ trust in
ADS while T̂ and Σ̂T are the estimates of trust in ADS and the covariance of this
estimate. A delay of one event is represented by the z−1 block.
4.4.1 Experiment and Data Collection
4.4.1.1 Study design
We employed a 4 (ADS error types) × 2 (road shapes) mixed user experimental
design. Each participant experienced 2 trials, and each trial had 12 events. These
2 trials had the same ADS error type (between-subjects condition) and 2 different
road shapes (within-subjects condition). The ADS error types that varied between
subjects corresponded to 4 different conditions: control, for which all 12 events were
true alarms; false alarms only, for which the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, and 8th events were false
alarms; misses only, for which the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, and 8th events were misses; and false
alarms and misses combined condition, for which the 2nd and 5th events were false
alarms, while the 3rd and 8th events were misses. The ADS error type was assigned
according to the participants’ sequential identification number. The road shapes were
represented by straight and curvy roads, and were assigned in alternating order to
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minimize learning and ordering effects.
4.4.1.2 Tasks
The experimental setup was very similar to the one described in Chapter III, the
main difference was the layouts of the roads. We used the ANVEL simulator [30]
and the NDRT was the previously used adapted version of the Surrogate Reference
Task [47], implemented with PEBL [80]. Figure 4.3 (a) shows the experimental setup
with the tasks performed by the driver.
In the driving task, participants operated a simulated vehicle equipped with an
ADS that provided it automatic lane keeping, cruise control, and collision avoidance
features. Participants were able to activate the ADS (starting autonomous driving
mode) by pressing a button on the steering wheel, and to take back control by braking
or by steering. Figure 4.3(b) shows the driving task interface with the driver.
With the ADS activated (i.e., with the vehicle in self-driving mode), participants
were expected to execute the visual search NDRT. They were not allowed to engage in
both driving and executing the NDRT simultaneously, and the experimenters would
stop the test if they did so. Participants were informed that the vehicle could request
their intervention if they identified obstacles on the road, as it is expected for Level
3 ADSs [101]. Figure 4.3(c) shows the NDRT interface with the driver.
Participants could not focus only on the NDRT, because the ADS demanded
them to occasionally take control of the driving task. They were asked to be ready to
take control upon intervention requests from the ADS, as some obstacles occasionally
appeared on the road. At that point, the ADS identified the obstacles and asked
the driver to take control, as the vehicle was not able to autonomously change lanes
and maneuver around them. If drivers did not take control, the emergency brake was
triggered when the vehicle got too close to an obstacle, and then drivers lost points on
their ongoing NDRT score. In that situation, they still needed to take control of the
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driving task, maneuver around the obstacle and re-engage the autonomous driving
mode. They obtained 1 point for each correctly chosen “Q” and lost 5 points each
time the emergency brake got triggered.
With the events characterized by true alarms or misses, drivers had to take con-
trol and pass the obstacle. Subsequently, they were asked about their “trust change”.
When asked, they had to stop the vehicle to answer the question on a separate touch-
screen. They reported their trust change in the events characterized by true alarms,
false alarms, and misses. They had 5 choices, varying from “Decreased Significantly”
to “Increased Significantly”, as shown in Figure 4.3(d). These choices were then used
as indicators of the differences ∆TQk ∈ {−2,−1, 0, 1, 2} (we use the superscript Q to
indicate that the differences were quantized).
4.4.1.3 Procedure
Upon arrival, participants were asked to complete a consent form as well as a
pre-experiment survey related to their personal information, experience with ADS,
mood and propensity to trust the ADS. After the survey, the tasks were explained
and the experimenter gave details about the experiment and the simulated vehicle
control. Participants then completed a training session before the actual experiment
began and, in sequence, completed their two trials. After each trial, participants were
asked to complete post-trial surveys related to their trust in the ADS. These surveys
were administered electronically. Each trial took approximately 10 to 15 minutes,
and the whole experiment lasted approximately 60 minutes.
A basic fixed level of cash compensation of $15.00 was granted for the partici-
pants. However, they also had the possibility of receiving a performance bonus. The
bonus was calculated according to their best final NDRT score, considering both tri-
als experienced by the participant. Those who made up to 199 points in the NDRT
did not receive a bonus. However, bonuses of $5.00 were granted for those who made
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Figure 4.3: Experimental design (a), composed of the driving task (b), the NDRT (c)
and the trust change self-report question (d). The trust change self-report question
popped up after every event within the trials (there were 12 events per trial), including
true alarms, false alarms, and misses.
between 200 and 229 points; $15.00 for those who made between 230 and 249 points;
and $35.00 for those who made 250 points or more. From the total of 80 participants,
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28 got $5.00 bonuses, 6 participants got $15.00 bonuses, and no participant got the
$35.00 bonus.
4.4.1.4 Apparatus
As illustrated in Figure 4.3(a), the simulator setup was composed of three LCD
monitors integrated with a Logitech G-27 driving kit. Two other smaller touchscreen
monitors positioned to the right hand of the participants were used for the NDRT and
for the trust change self-report questions. The console was placed to face the central
monitoring screen so as to create a driving experience as close as possible to that of
a real car. In addition, we used Pupil Lab’s Pupil Core eye tracker mobile headset,
equipped with a fixed “world camera” to measure participants’ gaze positional data.
4.4.1.5 Measured Variables
Measured variables included participants’ subjective responses, behavioral re-
sponses and performance. Observation variables ϕ(tk), υ(tk) and π(tk) were also mea-
sured and averaged for the intervals [tk, tk+1]. Subjective data was gathered through
surveys before and after each trial, including trust perception, risk perception, and
workload perception. We used questionnaires adapted from [83] and [100] to measure
post-trial trust and risk perception, respectively. Eye-tracking data included eyes’
positions and orientations, as well as videos of the participants’ fields of view.
T (tk) was computed from the post-trial trust perception self-reports T (tf ) and
the within trial trust change self-reports ∆TQk , as in Equation (4.4),
T (t12) = T (tf ) ;





where k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , 11}, and α = 3. Therefore, the trust measures T (tk) were
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back-computed for the events within a trial. The α value was chosen to characterize
noticeable variations in T (tk), but also avoiding T (tk) values falling outside the in-
terval [Tmin, Tmax]. Positive values for α between 1 and 3 were tested and provided
results similar to those reported in Section 4.5.
4.4.2 Model Parameters
Considering the formulation presented in Section 4.3 and the data obtained in the
user study, we turn to the identification of parameters for the trust model and the
design of the trust estimator. We found the best fit parameters for the short-term
(i.e., with respect to events) trust dynamics represented by the state-space model in
Equation (4.3). From the 80 participants, we selected 4 from the dataset—each one
chosen randomly within each of the 4 possible ADS error type conditions—and used
the data from the remaining 76 to compute the parameters, which are presented in
Table 4.1. We used the data from the 4 selected participants for validation. The
parameters of the state-space model from Equation (4.3) were identified with maxi-
mum likelihood estimation through linear mixed-effects models. Our models included
a random offset per participant to capture their individual biases and mitigate the
effects of these biases in the results, and to represent normally distributed random
noises.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Participants’ Data Analysis
For each of the observation variables, we obtained 1920 measurements (80 partic-
ipants × 2 trials per participant × 12 events per trial). The parameters describing
these distributions are presented in Table 4.2. The histograms for these distributions
are shown in Figure 4.4; the probability density functions corresponding to normal
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Table 4.1: Trust in ADS state-space model parameters
Parameter Value Estimate S.E.M†




c11 6.87× 10−3 3.3× 10−4
c21 9.10× 10−3 1.0× 10−4
c31 4.38× 10−3 1.0× 10−4
σ2u 1.24 –
Σw diag(1.0, 1.6, 1.8)× 10−3 –
†S.E.M = Standard error of the mean.
distributions N (µϕ, σ2ϕ), N (µυ, σ2υ) and N (µπ, σ2π) are also shown.





Minimum 0.02 0.17 0.00
25th percentile 0.32 0.69 0.28
50th percentile 0.47 0.74 0.33
75th percentile 0.65 0.79 0.38
Maximum 0.97 0.92 0.56
Mean µ 0.49 0.73 0.32
Standard Deviation σ 0.20 0.08 0.08
The plots in Figure 4.5 present the average trust over interactions for all partic-
ipants in each ADS error type conditions, indicating the occurrence of true alarms,
false alarms and misses (represented by ‘T’, ‘F’ and ‘M’, respectively). The curves are
consistent with the expected behavior for the state-space model (4.3) and the model
parameters given in Table 4.1. These plots are similar to those presented in Figure
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Figure 4.4: Histograms for the Focus ϕ, ADS usage υ and NDRT performance π
measurements distributions and overlapping probability density functions with corre-
sponding means and standard deviations. Each distribution had 1920 measurements
(= 80 participants × 2 trials per participant × 12 measurements per trial).
3.7, with the difference that the reliability of the ADS was manipulated not only with
false alarms, but also with misses.
4.5.2 Trust Estimation Results
After obtaining the model parameters, we applied Algorithm 1 to estimate the
trust levels of the participants that were excluded from the dataset. Figure 4.6(a1:a4)
and Figure 4.7(a1:a4) present the trust estimation results for these participants (iden-
tified as A, B, C and D). Participant A experienced the combined ADS error type
condition; participant B experienced the false alarms only condition; participant C
experienced the control condition; and participant D experienced the misses only con-
dition. The plots bring together their two trials and the different estimate results for
each trial. For participants A and B, trial 1 was conducted on a curvy road and trial
2 on a straight road. For participants C and D, trial 1 was conducted on a straight
road and trial 2 on a curvy road.
The accuracy of our estimates improved over time as the participants interacted
with the ADS. Figure 4.6(a1) shows that, for participant A, trial 1, the initial trust
estimate T̂ (t0) and the initial observed trust T (t0) were close to each other (in compar-
ison to Figure 4.6(a2)). This means that the estimate computed from the observations
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Figure 4.5: Plots of the average trust for all participants in each ADS error type
condition. When participants were using a reliable ADS, i.e., in the Control condition,
trust increased steadily after the true alarms indicated by ‘T’ in the horizontal axes.
After false alarms or misses (indicated respectively by ‘F’ and ‘M’) occurred, trust
decreased accordingly.
taken at the beginning of the trial, i.e., ϕ(t0), υ(t0), and π(t0), approximately matched
the participants’ self-reported trust level. Considering the Kalman filter’s behavior,
the curves remained relatively close together over the events, as expected. Therefore
the estimate followed the participants’ trust over the trial events. This accuracy,
however, was not achieved at the beginning of the second trial, as can be observed
in Figure 4.6(a2). This figure shows that, in trial 2, T̂ (t0) and T (t0) had a greater
difference, but this difference decreased over the events as the curves converged. A
similar effect can be observed for participants B, trial 2 as in Figure 4.6(a3:a4) and
for participant C, as in Figure 4.7(a1:a2).
Participants’ responses to similar inputs were not always coherent, and varied over
time or under certain conditions. Predominantly, participants’ self-reported trust
increased after true alarms (indicated by the prevailing positive steps at the events
that are characterized by orange circles). In addition, after false alarms and misses,
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Figure 4.6: Trust estimation results for participants A and B. Participant A expe-
rienced both false alarms and misses (combined ADS error type condition) while
participant B experienced false alarms only (false alarms only condition). For both
participants, the first trial was conducted on a curvy road, while the second trial
was conducted on a straight road. Curves in (a1:a4) show the estimation results,
indicating that the estimator can track the trust self-reports, i.e., T̂ (tk) approaches
T (tk) over the events. This is made possible with the processing of the observations
variables focus time ratio (ϕ), ADS usage time ratio (υ), and NDRT performance (π)
presented in (b1:d4).
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Figure 4.7: Trust estimation results for participants C and D. Participant C ex-
perienced only true alarms (control ADS error type condition) while participant D
experienced misses only (misses only condition). For both participants, the first trial
was conducted on a straight road, while the second trial was conducted on a curvy
road.
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they usually reported trust decreases (indicated by the prevailing negative steps at
the events characterized by yellow diamonds and purple triangles). However, it is
noticeable that, for participant A, trial 2, the self-reported trust was more “stable”,
as indicated by fewer steps on the red dashed curve. Two different factors could
have contributed to the less frequent variations on T (tk): as the participant was on a
straight road, the perceived risk might not have been high enough to induce drops after
false alarms; or, as it was the participant’s second trial, the learning effects might have
softened the self-reported trust changes (especially after false alarms). In any case, the
difference between the curve patterns in Figure 4.6(a1) and Figure 4.6(a2) suggests
a non-constancy on participant A’s characteristic behaviors. A similar behavior was
observed for participant C, trial 1 after the 8th alarm and for trial 2.
The observation variables we selected were effective in representing drivers’ trust-
ing behaviors. Figure 4.6(b1:d4) show the observation variables corresponding to the
trust curves in Figure 4.6(a1:a4), while Figure 4.7(b1:d4) correspond to 4.7(a1:a4).
All observation variables have a positive correlation with trust, and therefore it can
be observed that some noticeable peaks and drops in the observation variables cor-
respond to positive and negative variations in the estimate of trust in ADS. This is
especially true for the counter-intuitive behaviors of the participants. For instance,
as it can be seen in Figure 4.6(a3:d3), after the 8th event—which was a false alarm—
participant B reported a drop in his/her trust level, indicating that T (t8) < T (t7).
However, his/her behaviors did not reflect that drop: we can notice that ϕ(t8) > ϕ(t7),
υ(t8) > υ(t7) and π(t8) > π(t7). As a result, the trust estimate had an increase, and
eventually we had T̂ (t8) > T̂ (t7). Similar counter-intuitive situations can be identified
for participants A, C and D.
The accuracy of the estimates depends on the covariance parameters, which can
be tailored for the driver. The trust estimate bounds represented by blue bands in
Figure 4.6(a1:a4) and Figure 4.7(a1:a4) are approximations obtained with the over-
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lay of several simulations (100 in total). This variability is due to the uncertainty
represented by the random noise parameters u(tk) and w(tk), and the width of the
bound bands is related to the computed covariances σ2u and Σw. Both lower values
for σ2u and higher values for Σw entries would imply a narrower band, meaning that
the estimator would have less variability (and therefore could be slower on tracking
trust self-reports). Meanwhile, higher σ2u and lower values of Σw entries would imply,
respectively, a less accurate process model and on observations considered more reli-
able. This would characterize wider bands, and thus the variations on the estimate
curves would be more pronounced.
Trust estimates may be more accurate with the individualization of the model
parameters. Although we used the average parameters presented in Table 4.1 for the
results, a comparison of Figure 4.6(a2), Figure 4.7(a1) and Figure 4.7(a3:a4) with
Figure 4.6(a4), suggests that the balance between σ2u and Σw should be adapted
to each individual driver. It can be seen that these parameters permitted a quick
convergence of T (tk) and T̂ (tk) for participants A, C and D, but that 12 events were
not enough for the estimator to track the trust self-reports from participant B. We also
computed the root-mean-square (RMS) error of the estimate curves resulting from
the 100 simulations for participants A, B, C and D. The RMS error distributions had
the characteristics presented in Table 4.3.
Considering the 100-points trust range, for participant A the error stands below
10%, while for participants B, C and D it stands below 20%. This difference sug-
gests that the parameters of the model are more suitable for participant A than for
participant B, C and D.
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Table 4.3: RMS error of the estimate curves from Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7
Participant Trial Mean Standard Deviation
A 1 4.9 2.4
A 2 10.0 2.1
B 1 14.5 2.8
B 2 19.1 1.2
C 1 14.2 0.4
C 2 2.7 0.6
D 1 20.7 2.2
D 2 13.8 3.4
4.6 Discussion
4.6.1 Implications
The goal of this chapter was to propose a framework for real-time estimation of
drivers’ trust in ADS based on drivers’ behaviors and dynamic trust models. As
shown by the results, our framework successfully provides estimates of drivers’ trust
in ADS that increase in accuracy over time. This framework is based on a novel
methodology that has considerable advantages over previously reported approaches,
mainly related to our trust dynamics model and the simpler methods needed for its
implementation.
First, the sensing machinery required for implementing our methodology is as
simple and as unobtrusive as possible. Considering practical aspects related to the
framework implementation, we have chosen observation variables that are suitable for
the estimation of drivers’ trust in ADS. An eventual implementation of the proposed
estimator on an actual self-driving vehicle would depend only on the utilization of an
eye-tracking system and on the integration between the ADS and the tasks performed
by the driver. Our unique observation variable that comes from a direct instrumen-
tation of drivers’ behavioral patterns is the eye-tracking-based focus on the NDRT.
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The other observation variables (NDRT performance and ADS usage) are indirectly
measured by the ADS. Eye-tracking-based metrics are appropriate for trust measur-
ing as they do not require sensory devices that would be impractical and/or intrusive
for drivers. Although we have used an eye tracker device that has to be directly worn
by the participant, there exist different eye-tracking systems that do not need to get
in direct contact with the driver to sense their gaze orientations, and could be used
in a real world implementation of this framework.
Second, the results of our framework show that it can successfully estimate drivers’
trust in ADS levels, but the accuracy of the estimates were different depending on
the driver. The application of the model represented by Equation (4.3) in the trust
estimator algorithm required average (population-wise) state-space model parame-
ters. These parameters were computed with a minimization approach, and they are
indications of reasonable statistics for average values conditioned to our pool of par-
ticipants. However, these parameters could vary drastically from driver to driver. In
a more sophisticated implementation of our modeling and estimation methodology,
the values from Table 4.1 should serve as preliminary parameters only. A possible
way to improve our proposed methodology would be to integrate it with learning
algorithms to adapt the model parameters to individual drivers. Moreover, as drivers
become accustomed to the ADS’s operation, these parameters might also vary over
time (making the time-invariant description from Equation (4.3) not useful). There-
fore, an eventual ADS featuring our framework should also be sufficiently flexible
to track the changes in individual drivers’ model parameters over time, as proposed
in [130].
Third, the framework opens paths for more research on the development of more
complex models and estimation techniques for trust. These techniques may encom-
pass both the driver-ADS context and other contexts characterized by the interaction
between humans and robots. In the case of driver-ADS contexts, the events that
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trigger the propagation of the trust state do not need to be restricted to the forward
collision alarm interactions characterized by true alarms, false alarms and misses. A
wider range of experiences could be considered in the process model represented by
Equation (4.3), such as events related to the ADS driving performance or to external
risk perceived by the ADS. Drivers could be engaged in alternative NDRTs, as long
as they are integrated with the ADS and a continuous performance metric is defined
as observation variable. In the case of interactions between humans and robots in
different scenarios, the concepts that were defined in Section 4.3 are easily expandable
to other contexts. The main requirement would be the characterization of what are
the events that represent important (positive and negative) experiences within inter-
actions between the human and robot. These positive and negative experiences would
generally characterize the robot’s performance, which is an essential factor describing
the basis of trust, as identified by Lee and See [60]. Robots that execute specific
tasks in goal-oriented contexts could have their performances measured in sequential
time instances that would trigger the transition of the trust state. For instance, these
performance measures could be a success/failure classification, such as pick and place
task with a robotic arm [114,122,133]; or a continuous performance evaluation, such
as when a follower robot loses track of its leader due to the accumulation of sensor
error [102,103].
Finally, the framework provides trust estimates that are useful for the design of
trust controllers to be embedded in new ADSs. In this framework, trust is mod-
eled as a continuous state variable, which is consistent with widely used trust scales
and facilitates the processing and analysis of trust variations over time. This trust
representation permits considering the incremental characteristics of the trust devel-
opment phenomena, which is consistent with the literature on trust in automation
and opens a path for the development of future trust control frameworks in ADSs.
Since it is developed in the state-space form, our method for modeling drivers’ trust
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in ADS enables the use of classical application-proven techniques such as the Kalman
filter-based method we have used in Algorithm 1.
In addition, a practical implication of the proposed estimation framework is that
it could be used in innovative adaptive systems capable of estimating drivers’ trust
levels and reacting in accordance with the estimates, in order to control drivers’ trust
in ADS. These functionalities would need to involve strategies to monitor not only
drivers’ behaviors but also the reliability of the system (for example, the acknowledg-
ment of false alarms and misses mentioned in Section 4.3.1, assumption 6.). These
errors could be identified after a sequence of confirmations or contradictions of the
sensors’ states, while the vehicle gets closer to the event position, entering the ranges
of higher accuracy of those sensors. Moreover, the system could request the driver to
provide it feedback about issued alarms to identify its own errors, asking confirmation
about identified obstacles or enabling quick report of missed obstacles, a functionality
that is currently present in GPS navigation mobile applications [123]. Although these
questions could represent an inconvenient distraction, this strategy is not as disrup-
tive as demanding drivers to provide trust self-reports, especially during autonomous
operation. The integration between the ADS and the NDRTs would also be needed
for the assessment of observation variables and, eventually, actions to increase or de-
crease trust in ADS could be taken to avoid trust-related issues (such as under- and
over-trust). These trust control schemes would be useful for improving driver-ADS
interactions, having the goal of optimizing the safety and the performance of the team
formed by the driver and the vehicle.
4.6.2 Limitations
4.6.2.1 Trust Modeling and Estimation Methodology
A limitation of the study presented in this chapter relates to the assumptions
associated with how we derive the state-space model for trust in the ADS. The re-
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lationships represented by Equations (4.1) and (4.2) restrict the experiences of the
trustor agent (the driver) to the events represented by true alarms, false alarms and
misses of the forward collision alarm. In fact, other experiences such as the ADS’s
continuous driving performances can characterize events that could be represented
by signals of different types other than booleans. The simplification of the relation-
ships represented by (4.1) and (4.2) to the LTI system represented by (4.3) is useful
and convenient for the system identification process and for the trust estimator de-
sign. However, the resulting model fails to capture some phenomena that are likely
to occur during the interactions between drivers and ADSs. These phenomena might
include the variation of model parameters over time (i.e., after a reasonable period
of drivers’ interaction with the ADS) or the possibly nonlinear relationship between
trust and the observation variables. An example is the relationship between trust
and NDRT performance: it is unlikely that in a more rigorous modeling approach we
could consider these variables to be directly proportional. Usually, an excess of trust
(overtrust) in a system can lead to human errors, which might eventually result in
performance drops.
4.6.2.2 User Study
There are several other limitations that relate to the experimental study presented
in this chapter.
First, most participants were young students, very experienced with video games
and other similar technologies. Our results could have been biased by these demo-
graphic characteristics.
Second, we employed a simulator in our experimental study. The use of a simulated
driving environment is a means of testing potentially dangerous technologies. In
general, people tend to act similarly in real and simulated environments [42]. However,
due to the risks involved in driving, we acknowledge that participants might not have
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felt as vulnerable as they would if this study had been conducted in a real car.
Finally, we employed a specific NDRT to increase the participants’ cognitive load.
The recursive visual search task gives drivers the opportunity to switch their attention
between the driving and the NDRT very frequently. Other types of NDRTs could
demand drivers’ attention for longer periods of time, and this could induce a different
effect on trust, risk perception or performance. The NDRT performance metric in
this study is very specific and may or may not be generalizable to other task types.
4.6.3 Improvements and Usability
Additional improvements to our framework may be achieved by addressing the
limitations of the reported user study. A vehicle with autonomous capabilities can
be utilized to make the participants’ experience as similar as possible to a realistic
situation. Additionally, our methodology could be tested in other different scenarios
where the complexity of the NDRT and of the environment are increased.
4.7 Conclusion and Contribution
The main contribution of this chapter is the proposed framework for the estima-
tion of drivers’ trust in ADSs. This framework is applicable for SAE level 3 ADSs,
where drivers conditionally share driving control with the system, and that system
is integrated with a visually demanding NDRT. In comparison to previous trust esti-
mation approaches, it has practical advantages in terms of implementation ease and
of the format of its trust estimates outputs.
We investigated the effectiveness of the proposed framework with a user study
that is described in Section 4.4. In this user study, participants operated a simulated
vehicle featuring an ADS that provided self-driving capabilities for the vehicle. Par-
ticipants conducted two concurrent (driving and non-driving) tasks, while reporting
their levels of trust in the ADS. Our goal was to establish a computational model for
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drivers’ trust in ADS that permitted trust prediction during the interactions between
drivers and ADSs, considering the behaviors of both the system and the driver. We
found the parameters of a discrete-time, LTI state-space model for trust in ADS.
These parameters represented the average characteristics of our drivers, considering
the resultant experiment dataset. With the calculation of the parameters, it was pos-
sible to establish a real-time trust estimator, which could track the trust levels over
the interactions between the drivers and the ADS.
In summary, our results reveal that our framework was effective for estimating
drivers’ trust in ADS through the integration of the NDRT and behavioral sensors to
ADSs. We also show, however, that a more advanced strategy for trust estimation
must take into consideration the individual characteristics of the drivers, making
systems flexible enough to adjust their model parameters during continuous use. Our
technique opens ways for the design of smart ADSs able to monitor and dynamically
adapt their behaviors to the driver, in order control drivers’ trust levels and improve
driver-ADS teaming. More accurate trust models can improve the performance of
the proposed trust estimation framework and, therefore, are still required. However,
the utilization of this trust estimation framework can be a first step to designing
systems that can, eventually, increase safety and optimize joint performances during
the interactions between drivers and ADSs embedded in self-driving vehicles.
The modeling technique and the trust estimator presented in this chapter could
be used in the design of a trust management system. This trust management system
could be based on the comparison of trust level estimates with the assessed capa-
bility and reliability of the vehicle in different situations, which depends on the risk
involved in the operation. From the comparison, the trust calibration status could be
evaluated, and a possible mismatch between trust and capability (or reliability) levels
would indicate the need for system reaction. This reaction would consist of actions
to manipulate trust levels, seeking to increase trust in case of distrust (or undertrust)
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and to decrease it in case of overtrust. An example of trust management system with
these characteristics is presented in Chapter V.
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CHAPTER V
Calibration of Drivers’ Trust in ADSs
5.1 Introduction
Automated vehicles (AVs) that intelligently interact with drivers must build a
trustworthy relationship with them. A calibrated level of trust is fundamental for the
AV and the driver to collaborate as a team. Techniques that allow AVs to perceive
drivers’ trust from drivers’ behaviors and react accordingly are, therefore, needed for
context-aware systems designed to avoid trust miscalibrations. This chapter proposes
a framework for the management of drivers’ trust in AVs. The framework is based on
the identification of trust miscalibrations and on the activation of different communi-
cation styles to encourage or warn the driver when necessary. Our results show that
the management framework is effective, increasing (decreasing) trust of undertrusting
(overtrusting) drivers, and reducing the average trust miscalibration time periods by
approximately 40%. Similar to the trust estimator proposed in Chapter IV, the trust
management framework is applicable for the design of SAE Level 3 automated driving
systems and has the potential to improve performance and safety of driver–AV teams.
This chapter is based on the work published in [7]. The remainder of the chapter
is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents the problem of identifying trust miscal-
ibrations and manipulating drivers’ trust in the AV (or, interchangeably, the ADS)
to eventually achieve trust calibration. Section 5.2 also proposes a solution for that
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problem, managing trust by combining the trust estimation method presented in
Chapter IV with a rule-based controller to calibrate trust. Section 5.3 focuses on the
implementation of the methods and the user study conducted to validate the trust
management solution. Section 5.4 details the results obtained with the utilization of
the trust management framework, and compares metrics of overall trust calibration
between groups of participants that used and that did not use the proposed trust
management framework. Section 5.6 concludes and presents a brief discussion on
future directions for the research presented in this chapter.
5.2 Problem Statement
Considering the context of a driver interacting with an AV featuring an SAE
Level 3 automated driving system (ADS), we addressed two main problems. First,
we aimed to identify instances for which drivers’ trust in the AV is miscalibrated,
i.e., when the driver is undertrusting or overtrusting the AV. Second, we focused on
manipulating drivers’ trust in the AV to achieve calibrated levels, i.e., trust levels
that match the AV’s capabilities [60]. In other words, our goal was to increase or
decrease drivers’ trust in the AV whenever drivers were undertrusting or overtrusting
the AV, respectively.
In SAE Level 3 ADSs, drivers are required to take back control when the system
requests intervention or when it fails [101]. We assume that the AV has automated
lane-keeping, cruise control and forward collision alarm functions that can be acti-
vated (all at once) and deactivated at any time by the driver. The AV can also identify
different road difficulty levels and process drivers’ behavioral signals to estimate their
trust in the AV.
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Straight portion - High Capability
Curvy portion - Medium Capability
Dirt portion - Low Capability








Regular direction trials start point
Regular direction trials end point
Reverse direction trials start point
Reverse direction trials end point
Obstacles in the Reverse direction
Key:
Figure 5.1: Circuit track used in this study. The portions of the road correspond
to the capability of the AV. In the regular direction, drivers start at point A, follow
the “straight” path in the clockwise direction, cover the curvy path and finish the
trial at point B, right after passing through the dirt road portion. In the reverse
direction, drivers start at point C, follow the curvy path in the counterclockwise
direction, cover the straight path, continue to the curvy path (until the dirt portion),
pass through the dirt portion, and finish the trial at point D. Both directions have
12 events (encounters with obstacles), and it took drivers approximately 10 to 12
minutes to complete a trial.
5.2.1 Solution Approach
We implemented a scenario to represent the described problem context with an AV
simulator. We established simulations where drivers took trials in a predefined circuit
track. The circuit track was divided into distinct parts, having three predefined risk
levels, corresponding to the difficulty associated with each part of the circuit track.
The easy parts of the circuit track consisted of predominantly straight roads; the
intermediate difficulty parts were curvy paved roads; and the difficult parts were
curvy dirt roads. Within these trials, drivers encountered abandoned vehicles on the
road, which represented obstacles that the AV was not able to maneuver around by
itself (using its automated driving functions). At that point, drivers had to take
over control, pass the obstacle and then engage the autonomous driving mode again.
Figure 5.1 shows the circuit implemented in the simulation environment.
90
We needed to compare drivers’ trust levels and the AV’s capability levels to iden-
tify trust miscalibrations. Therefore, we defined three capability levels for the AV,
corresponding to the difficulty of the circuit track parts. The AV’s forward collision
alarm was able to identify the obstacles and also to trigger an emergency brake if
the driver did not take control in time to maneuver around the obstacles. These two
actions were activated at different distances to the obstacles, represented by the two
circular regions represented in Figure 5.2. On straight paved roads these distances
were larger, representing the longer perception ranges of the AV sensors. On more
difficult parts of the circuit (i.e., curvy or dirt), however, the curves and the irregular
terrain reduced that perception range, implying shorter distances. The AV was able
to identify the obstacle, warn the driver and eventually brake at a fair distance from
the obstacle when it was operated on straight roads. This condition corresponded to
the AV’s high capability. On curvy and dirt roads, the AV was not able to anticipate
the obstacles at a reasonable distance, giving drivers less time to react and avoid
triggering the emergency brake. These conditions corresponded to the AV’s medium
and low capabilities.
In the scenario, drivers also had to simultaneously perform a visually demanding
NDRT, consisting of a visual search on a separate touchscreen device that exchanged
information with the AV. They performed the NDRT only when the self-driving
capabilities were engaged. The behavioral measures taken from the drivers were
the same from Chapter IV: their focus on the NDRT (from an eye tracker); their
ADS usage rate; and their NDRT performance, measured by the number of correctly
performed visual searches per second. Drivers were penalized if the emergency brake
was triggered, which gave them a sense of the costs and risks of neglecting the AV
operation. Specific details about the tasks are given in Section 5.3.3.
The block diagram in Figure 5.3 presents our proposed trust management frame-















Figure 5.2: Concentric circles represent the distances for which the warning mes-
sage “Stopped vehicle ahead!” was provided to the driver, and the emergency brake
was triggered. The distances varied according to the difficulty of the road. If the
emergency brake was triggered, the drivers were penalized on their NDRT score.
The AV block represents elements of the vehicle, such as the sensors to monitor the
environment and the ability to output verbal messages to interact with the driver.
We present the definitions and the notation used in this chapter in Table 5.1.
5.2.2 Trust Estimator
Figure 5.3 illustrates the trust estimator block, with the AV’s alarms and the ob-
servation variables ϕk, υk and πk as inputs, and a numerical estimate of drivers’ trust
in the AV as the output Tk. The observation variables capture the drivers’ behav-
ior, which is affected by drivers’ trust in the AV. This trust estimator is a simplified
version of what is presented in Chapter IV and in [5], and was chosen because of its
simple implementation and proven ability to track drivers’ trust. Alternative trust
estimators could be integrated to the proposed trust management framework if the
inputs they require can be captured in real-time. Differently from Chapter IV, we













Figure 5.3: Block diagram that represents the trust management framework. The
trust estimator block provides a trust estimate Tk to the trust calibrator, which
compares it to the capabilities of the AV during operation. The calibrator then
defines the communication style that the AV should adopt, and the AV provides the
corresponding verbal messages to the driver. Lk represents an alarm provided by the
ADS when an obstacle on the road is identified. The observation variables ϕk, υk and
πk represent drivers’ behaviors, from which drivers’ “real” trust (considered a latent
variable) is estimated. A delay of one event is represented by the z−1 block.





[t0, tf ] ∈ R+
Trials occur when drivers operate the vehicle on a predefined route,
and are characterized by their corresponding time intervals.
Events,
k ∈ N \ {0}
Events occur each time the ADS warns the driver about an obstacle
on the road at tk, t0 < tk < tf .
Alarm,
Lk ∈ {0, 1}
Boolean variable that is set when the AV correctly identifies an
obstacle and warns the driver at the event k. It is reset after
the driver passes the obstacle
Focus,
ϕk ∈ [0, 1]
Drivers’ focus on the NDRT, the ratio of time the driver spends
looking at the NDRT screen during [tk, tk+1).
Usage,
υk ∈ [0, 1]
Drivers’ ADS usage, the ratio of time the driver spends using
the AV’s self-driving capabilities during [tk, tk+1).
Performance,
πk ∈ R
Drivers’ NDRT performance, the number of points obtained on the
NDRT during [tk, tk+1), divided by ∆tk = tk+1 − tk.
Trust in the AV,
Tk ∈ [0, 100]
Drivers’ estimated trust in the AV. It is assigned to the interval
[tk, tk+1), computed from ϕk, υk, πk and is associated with the
covariance ΣT .
93
false alarms or misses.
The discrete LTI state-space model for trust dynamics has the form of Eq. (5.1),




 = CTk + wk. (5.1b)
Tk+1, the trust estimate at the event k+ 1, depends on Tk, the alarm Lk, and the
process noise uk. The observation variables depend on the estimated trust and output












; uk ∼ N (0, 0.252);
and wk ∼ N (0, diag(σ2ϕ, σ2υ, σ2π)), with σϕ = 1.8 × 10−4, συ = 7.0 × 10−5 and σπ =
5.7 × 10−2. (Please see Table 5.1 for variables’ definitions.) The parameters for Eq.
(5.1) are found by fitting linear models [106] using a previously obtained data set.
The state-space structure permits the application of Kalman filter-based techniques















where ϕ0, υ0 and π0 measured over the interval [t0, t1) and c1, c2, c3 are the entries
of C.
5.2.3 Trust Calibration
The trust calibrator block represented in Figure 5.3 was intended to affect drivers’
situation awareness (or risk perception) by changing the communication style of the
AV, with the goal of influencing drivers’ trust in the AV [77]. At every event k, the
AV interacted with the driver through verbal messages corresponding to the commu-
nication style defined in the trust calibrator block. The AV can encourage the driver
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to focus on the NDRT, moderately warn the driver about the difficulties of the road
ahead, or harshly warn the driver, literally demanding driver’s attention. Table 5.2
presents the messages the AV provided to the driver in four different communication
styles.
To identify trust miscalibrations, the trust calibrator compares the trust estimates
with the capability of the AV. Lee and See [60] considered both trust in the automated
system and the capabilities of the system as continua that must be comparable to
each other. We assumed that the AV’s capability corresponds to the three difficulty
levels of the road where the AV is operated. We divided the interval [0, 100], for which
drivers’ trust in the AV was defined, into three sub-intervals: [0, 25) corresponding
to low trust, [25, 75) corresponding to medium trust and [75, 100] corresponding to
high trust. The uneven distribution of the sub-interval lengths was chosen to mitigate
the uncertainty involved in trust estimation. We fit a wider range of values in the
medium level, and considered as “low trust” or “high trust” only the estimates that
were closer to 0 or 100, respectively. The quantization of both the driver’s trust in
the AV and the AV’s capability in three levels facilitates the real-time comparison of
these metrics. Moreover, it permits the definition of a finite set of rules for the trust
miscalibration issues. Depending on the application context, alternative quantizations
or AV capabilities distributions can be implemented without significant changes to
the trust calibrator’s framework.
A trust miscalibration is identified whenever there is a mismatch between the
AV’s capabilities and the driver’s level of trust in the AV. The communication style
of the AV is then selected after the trust miscalibration is identified. At every event,
this comparison results in the identification of one of four distinct driver trust states:
undertrusting the AV (Under); having an appropriate level of trust in the AV (Cal-
ibrated); overtrusting the AV (Over); or extremely overtrusting the AV (X-over).
Figure 5.4 shows the ruleset and the correspondence with the resultant communi-
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Table 5.2: Messages provided by the AV in each Communication Style
AV Communication Message
Style
Encouraging “Hey, this is an easy road. You don’t need to worry
about driving. I will take care of it while you focus
on finding the Qs.”
Silent [No message]
Warning “Hey, this part of the road is not very easy. You can
(moderate) still find the Qs, but please pay more attention to
the road.”
Warning “Look, I told you! I do need your attention. I can
(harsh) feel the road is terrible. I don’t know if I can keep
us totally safe!”
cation styles of the AV. Note that the establishment of three levels for trust and
AV capability is able to cover the occurrence of both undertrust and overtrust, and
also allows the identification of extreme overtrust. Extreme overtrust occurs when a
driver has a high level of trust in the AV while the AV’s capability is low, which is
likely to be crucial for driver safety. Therefore, we consider extreme overtrust a trust
miscalibration issue that should be seriously addressed.
5.3 Methods
A total of 40 participants (µAGE = 31; σAGE = 14 years) were recruited to take
part in the study. From these, 18 were female, 21 male and 1 preferred not to spec-
ify gender. We used emails and specialized advertising on the University of Michi-
gan’s web portal for behavioral and health studies recruitment. All regulatory ethical
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Figure 5.4: Rule set for the trust calibrator. The driver’s trust state and the commu-
nication style are defined when the AV compares its capability and the driver’s trust
level. E.g.: when trust is lower than the AV’s capabilities (light blue cells), the driver
is undertrusting the AV, and the encouraging communication style is selected.
5.3.1 Procedure
Participants signed a consent form and filled out a pre-experiment survey as soon
as they arrived at the experiment location. Next, the functions of the AV and the
experiment dynamics were explained, and a training drive allowed participants to get
familiar with both the AV simulator controls and the NDRT. Participants put the
eye-tracker device on and, after it was calibrated, started their first trial on the AV
simulator. After the trial, they filled out a post-trial survey. Next, they had their
second trial and filled out the post trial survey for the second time. Each experiment
took approximately 1 h, and the participants were compensated for taking part in the
study. The compensation varied accordingly to their highest total number of points
obtained in the NDRT, considering both of their trials. Minimum compensation was




All participants experienced one trial with the trust calibrator and one trial with-
out the trust calibrator. To avoid the participants driving in exactly the same con-
ditions in both of their trials, we varied the direction of the driving on the circuit
track. Participants drove in clockwise direction (i.e., regular direction) and counter-
clockwise direction (i.e., reverse direction), as mentioned in Figure 5.1. The “trust
calibrator use” × “drive direction” conditions were randomly assigned, depending on
the participant’s sequential identification number.
5.3.3 Tasks and Apparatus
The driving task was implemented with AirSim over Unreal Engine [108]. The
visual search NDRT was the same from Chapter III and Chapter IV, consisting of
finding “Q” characters among a field of “O” characters. The NDRT was implemented
with PEBL [80]. Participants’ scores increased by 1 point every time they correctly
selected the targets on the screen, and they lost 20 points each time the emergency
brake was activated. Source codes for both tasks are available at https://github.
com/hazevedosa/tiavManager. The experimental setup is shown in Figure 1.3.
5.4 Results
We analyzed the impacts of using the trust calibrator’s adaptive communication
with different communication styles on drivers’ trust in the AV (i.e., real-time es-
timated trust Tk). For this, we analyzed the differences in drivers’ trust estimates
between consecutive events after they had heard the messages from the AV. Drivers’
trust differences are given by ∆T = Tk − Tk−1, i.e., the difference between trust es-
timates after and before the event k. ∆T was specifically computed for the analysis,
and indicates how participants’ trust estimates changed after they were encouraged
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or warned by the AV at the event k (i.e., after the AV interacted with the drivers
adopting the communication style corresponding to drivers’ trust states at the event
k).
Drivers showed significant positive or negative differences in their trust estimates
after the AV encouraged or warned them. Table 5.3 and Figure 5.5 present the results
obtained with a linear mixed-effects model for ∆T . Linear mixed-effects models are
regression models that include both fixed and random effects of independent variables
on a dependent variable. Fixed effects represent the influence of the independent vari-
ables or treatments of primary interest (in this case, the communication styles) on the
dependent variable (i.e., trust difference ∆T ). Random effects represent differences
that are not explained by the factors of primary interest but are rather related to hier-
archical organizations present in the sample population (e.g., groups of data collected
from the same participant) [106]. For instance, in this analysis, a random intercept for
each participant in the experiment was added to the ∆T linear mixed-effects model.
In summary, we sought the β parameters that best fit the model
∆T = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + β3x3 + εp, (5.3)
where x1 = 1 when the communication style was “Encouraging” and x1 = 0 otherwise;
x2 = 1 when the communication style was “Warning (moderate)” and x2 = 0 other-
wise; and x3 = 1 when the communication style was “Warning (harsh)” and x3 = 0
otherwise. The random effect εp had mean µ = 0 and standard deviation σ = 25.3,
and represented each participant’s characteristic intercept and the irreducible error
of the model. Table 5.3 shows that all β parameter estimates corresponding to the

























































































































































































































































































































































In general, the reaction of the drivers to the AV messages followed an expected
trend. The lack of messages did not significantly change driver’s behaviors when
their trust in the AV was calibrated: the average difference—considered the reference
intercept for the linear mixed-effects model—was 1.7 units, but the p-value of 0.36
indicates that it was not significantly different from 0. The encouraging messages
helped drivers to increase their trust in the AV: as shown in Table 5.3, the average
increase was 1.7 + 15.4 = 17.1 units for undertrusting drivers. The warning messages
had the effect of decreasing their trust in the AV: trust estimates of overtrusting
drivers varied by 1.7− 9.0 = −7.3 units, and for extremely overtrusting drivers, trust
estimates varied by 1.7 − 22.9 = −21.2 units. Figure 5.6 exemplifies the time trace
for a participant’s trust estimates during a trial, indicating the messages provided by
the AV and the regions for which trust would be considered calibrated.
The use of the calibrator reduced trust miscalibrations for 29 (out of 40) partic-
ipants. We computed trust miscalibration time ratios, representing the amount of
time drivers’ trust state was different from “Calibrated”, relative to the total time of
each trial. For the computation, we removed the intervals right after a change in AV’s
capabilities, where miscalibrations were intentionally caused. For all participants, the
average trust miscalibration time ratio was 70% in trials for which the calibrator was
not used. This ratio was reduced to 43.7% when the calibrator was used. Consider-
ing only the 29 participants that had their miscalibration time ratios reduced (when
using the trust calibrator), these ratios were 82% and 42%, respectively. For the
remaining 11 participants, the reasons for their lack of decreased trust miscalibration
are unknown, although we believe these reasons could be related to the limitations
imposed by the short duration of the experiment.
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Figure 5.5: Distributions of drivers’ trust in the AV differences (∆T ), for the dif-
ferent driver trust states. Overtrusting drivers received the warning communication
styles and responded with negative differences. Undertrusting drivers received the
encouraging communication styles and responded with positive differences. Drivers
with calibrated trust had relatively small positive differences on average. The average
values were obtained from the parameter estimates in Table 5.3.






























Figure 5.6: Time trace for a driver’s trust estimates Tk, which is assigned to the
interval [tk, tk+1) after being computed from ϕk, υk and πk. After two encouraging
messages when the driver undertrusted the AV, Tk increased. After a warning message
when the driver overtrusted the AV, Tk decreased. While driver’s trust was calibrated,
the calibrator refrained from providing messages to the driver.
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5.5 Discussion
The results presented in Section 5.4 support the effectiveness of our trust manage-
ment framework or, more specifically, our trust calibrator, which is the main intended
contribution of this chapter. When undertrusting drivers increase their trust in the
AV, their trust state is likely to approach the condition of trust calibration. Equiva-
lently, when overtrusting drivers decrease their trust in the AV, they are more likely
to reach trust calibration. The increase of trust for undertrusting drivers means
that after the communication from the AV, drivers were able to use the self-driving
capabilities more confidently, which was reflected by the increases of their related ob-
servation variables. Likewise, the framework was able to reduce drivers’ trust levels
if they presented overtrusting behaviors, when the driving context was not favorable
to the AV’s autonomous operation. The AV communication demanding drivers’ at-
tention to the driving task was effective, tending to adjust (i.e., decrease) drivers’
behaviors when they overtrusted the AV.
The proposed real-time trust calibration method was inspired by the relationships
among situation awareness, risk perception and trust. Previous works reported on
the effectiveness of situation awareness and perceived risk to impact drivers’ trust
in AVs [4, 92, 94, 139]. We applied different communications styles and messages in
an attempt to vary drivers’ situation awareness and risk perception in real time. In
consequence, we deliberately induced equivalent real-time changes in trust, supporting
the drivers to avoid trust miscalibrations by reducing the difference between their
trust estimates and the AV’s capability references. The main applicability of the
proposed trust management framework is to enable AVs to perceive drivers’ trusting
behaviors and react to them accordingly. Smart ADSs featuring this capability would
likely enhance the collaboration between the driver and the AV because it permits
the adaptation of attentional resources according to the operational environment and
situation.
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Our method can be considered a complement to [1] and [67]. The work in [67]
supported our insights for the use of eye-tracking-based techniques for real-time trust
estimation. In comparison to [1], we used different methods and behavioral variables
for trust estimation and extended their ideas to include the trust calibrator and
propose our trust management framework.
The limitations of the management framework are mostly related to the uncer-
tainty involved in influencing drivers’ trust with different messages, which might not
be very effective for some drivers. These drivers might need several interactions to
be persuaded by the AV. An example is illustrated in Figure 5.6, where the driver
was encouraged to trust the AV twice before the increase in ∆T = T3 − T2 was reg-
istered. The spreads of the box plots represented in Figure 5.5 suggest that, in less
frequent cases, drivers could present an unexpected behavior, not complying with
AV’s encouraging or warning messages. The lack of a process for customizing the pa-
rameters of our framework contributes to this uncertainty. Relying on average model
parameters in the trust estimation block can reduce the accuracy of the estimates
because the parameters of each driver can be very different from the averages. There-
fore, the trust estimation algorithm (and consequently, the management framework)
might work more efficiently if adapted to each individual driver. Another limitation
is that the capability of the AV was defined by the circuit track difficulty levels only.
Other factors can affect AV capability and could be considered, such as those related
to vehicular subsystems or to the weather.
5.6 Conclusions and Contribution
The main contribution of this chapter is the proposed trust calibration method,
which is used in the framework for managing drivers’ trust in AVs in order to avoid
trust miscalibration issues. The framework relies on observing drivers’ behaviors to
estimate their trust levels, comparing it to capabilities of the AVs, and activating dif-
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ferent communication styles to encourage undertrusting drivers and warn overtrusting
drivers. Our proposed management framework has shown to be effective in inducing
positive or negative changes on drivers’ trust in the AV and, consequently, mitigating
trust miscalibration.
The proposed trust management framework is applicable to intelligent driving
automation systems, providing them with the ability to perceive and react to drivers’
trusting behaviors, improving their interaction with the AVs, and maximizing their
safety and their performance in tasks other than driving. However, this framework
can not assess whether the driver can be trusted or not to take over control of the
vehicle when necessary. Chapter VI advances in this direction and proposes a bi-




Bi-Directional Model for Natural and Artificial
Trust
6.1 Introduction
Unlike traditional automation, autonomous robots could adjust their behaviors
depending on how their human counterparts appear to be trusting them or how hu-
mans appear to be trustworthy. This chapter introduces a novel capabilities-based
bi-directional multi-task trust model that can be used for trust prediction either
from a human or from a robotic trustor agent. Tasks are represented in terms of
their capability requirements, while trustee agents are characterized by their indi-
vidual capabilities. Trustee agent’s capabilities are not deterministic; rather, they
are represented by belief distributions. For each task to be executed, a higher level
of trust is assigned to trustee agents who have demonstrated that their capabilities
exceed the task’s requirements. Results of an online experiment with 284 partici-
pants are reported, and reveal that the proposed model outperforms existing models
for multi-task trust prediction from a human trustor. Simulations of the model for
determining trust from a robotic trustor are also presented. This bi-directional trust
model is intended to be useful for applications involving control authority allocation
in human-robot teams.
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This chapter is based on the research directions published in [8] and the work
published in [9]. The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section
6.2 describes the development of a bi-directional trust model that can be used in
situations where a human collaborates with a robot. This model can be used for
representing both the human’s “natural” trust and the robot’s “artificial” trust. Sec-
tion 6.3 presents an online experiment that was conducted to obtain the data for
validating the proposed bi-directional trust model. Section 6.4 focuses on the results
obtained, both for the prediction of human-drivers’ natural trust in robotic AVs and
for the definition of a robot’s artificial trust in humans. Section 6.5 discusses the main
strengths and limitations of the proposed bi-directional trust model and Section 6.6
concludes the chapter.
6.2 Bi-Directional Trust Model Development
6.2.1 Context Description
Consider the following situation: two agents (human H or robot R) collaborate
and must execute a sequence of tasks. These tasks are indivisible, and must be
executed by only one agent. The execution of each task can either succeed or fail.
For each task, one of the agents will be in the position of trustor, and the other will be
the trustee. Therefore, the trustor will be vulnerable to the trustee’s performance in
that task. From previous experiences with the trustee, the trustor has some implicit
knowledge about the trustee’s capabilities. This implicit knowledge is used by the
trustor assess how likely is the trustee to succeed or fail in the execution of a task.
6.2.2 Definitions
We define the terms and concepts we need for developing our trust model:
Definition 1 - Task. A task that must be executed is represented by γ ∈ Γ. Γ
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represents the set of all tasks that can be executed by the agents.
Definition 2 - Agent. An agent a ∈ {H,R} represents a trustee that could
execute a task γ.
Definition 3 - Capability. The representation of a specific skill that agents
have/that are required for the execution of tasks. We represent a capability as an
element of a closed interval Λi = [0, 1], i ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., n}, with n being a finite number
of dimensions characterizing distinct capabilities.
Definition 4 - Capability Hypercube. The compact set representation of n
distinct capabilities, given by the Cartesian product Λ =
∏n
i=1 Λi = [0, 1]
n. This
definition is inspired by the particular capabilities from Mayer’s model [69], namely
ability, benevolence and integrity, but the definition is intended to be broader than
these three dimensions.
Definition 5 - Agent’s Capability Transform. The agent capability transform
ξ : {H,R} → Λ maps an agent into a point in the capability hypercube representing
the agent’s capabilities, given by ξ(a) = λ = (λ1, λ2, ..., λn) ∈ Λ.
Definition 6 - Task Requirements Transform. The task requirements trans-
form % : Γ → Λ maps a task γ into the minimum required capabilities for the
execution of γ, given by %(γ) = λ̄ = (λ̄1, λ̄2, ..., λ̄n) ∈ Λ.
Definition 7 - Time Index. The time is discrete and represented by t ∈ N.
Definition 8 - Task Outcome. The outcome of a task γ after being executed by
the agent a at the time t is represented by Ω(ξ(a), %(γ), t) ∈ {0, 1}, where 0 represents
a failure and 1 represents a success. We also define the Boolean complement of Ω,
denoted by f, therefore being f = 1 when Ω = 0, and f = 0 when Ω = 1.
Leveraging the previous definitions, trust can be finally defined.
Definition 9 - Trust. A trustor agent’s trust in a trustee agent a to execute a
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task γ at a time instance t can be represented by
τ(a, γ, t) = P
(











where λ = ξ(a), λ̄ = %(γ), and bel(λ, t − 1) represents the trustor’s belief in the
agent’s capabilities λ at time t− 1 (i.e., before the actual task execution). The belief
is a dynamic probability distribution over the capability hypercube Λ. Note that,
at each time instance t, trust is a function of the task requirements λ̄, representing
a probability of success in [0, 1]. This formulation is consistent with the definition
presented in [115].
6.2.3 Bi-directional Trust Model
Our bi-directional model is defined by Eq. (6.1), and depends on the combination
of:
• a function to represent the “trust given the trustee’s capability”, represented
by the conditional probability p
(
Ω(λ, λ̄, t) = 1|λ, t
)
; and
• a process to dynamically update the trustor’s belief over the trustee capabilities
bel(λ, t).
We assume that an agent that successfully performs a task is more likely to be
successful on less demanding tasks. Conversely, an agent that fails on a task is more
likely to fail on more demanding tasks. We adapt the sigmoid function to represent







where βi, ζi > 0. We call the βi parameter the trustor’s pragmatism, while the ζi
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parameter is called the trustor’s skepticism, both for the i-th capability dimension.
Considering that all capability dimensions must be assessed concurrently and assum-
ing that the capability dimensions are represented by independent random variables,
for the probability computation, we have
p
(













where t was suppressed, as the resulting function is independent of the time. The
product of probabilities in Eq. (6.3) can quickly converge to zero as n increases.
Therefore, to improve code implementation stability in practical implementations, a
linear form of Eq. (6.3) could be used (i.e., by taking the logarithm on both sides of
the equation).
Trust dynamics is established with a process for updating bel(λ, t) that relates
observations of a trustee agent’s past performances with that agent’s likelihood of
success on related tasks. We consider that a trustor agent must build the belief about
the trustee’s capabilities after observations of the trustee’s performances. However,
initially, the trustor has no information about the trustee’s performances and capa-
bilities. We assume this is represented by bel(λ, 0) being a uniform probability dis-
tribution over the capability hypercube Λ, i.e., bel(λi, 0) = U(0, 1),∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}.
Next, after observing the sequence of successes and failures of the trustee in different
tasks, the trustor updates bel(λ, t), following the procedures in Algorithm 2 and in
Figure 6.1
6.2.4 Artificial Trust
For representing the artificial trust of a robotic trustor in a trustee agent, the
bi-directional trust model can be slightly modified. We can vanish the subjective
biases that characterize human trustors by considering large values for the parameters
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Algorithm 2 Capability Belief Initialization and Update
1: procedure Capability Hypercube Initialization
2: for i = 1 : n do
3: `i ← 0
4: ui ← 1
5: bel(λi, 0)← U(`i, ui) . Uniform distributions
6: end for
7: end procedure
8: procedure Capability Update(γ, bel(λ, t− 1))
. When trustor observes trustee executing γ at t
9: for i = 1 : n do
10: if Ω(λ, λ̄, t) = 1 then
11: if λ̄i > ui then
12: ui ← λ̄i
13: else if λ̄i > `i then
14: `i ← λ̄i
15: end if
16: else if Ω(λ, λ̄, t) = 0 then
17: if λ̄i < `i then
18: `i ← λ̄i
19: else if λ̄i < ui then
20: ui ← λ̄i
21: end if
22: end if
23: bel(λi, t)← U(`i, ui)
24: end for
25: end procedure
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1
0 1 0 1 0 1
Success Success Success FailureFailureFailure
When
If If If
Figure 6.1: Capability update procedure, where each capability dimension changes
after the trustor agent observes the trustee agent a executing a task γt (at a specific
time instance t). The belief distribution over a’s capabilities before the task execution
bel(λi, t − 1) is updated to bel(λi, t), depending on the task capability requirements
%(γt)i = λ̄i and on the performance of a in γt, which can be a success (Ω = 1) or a
failure (Ω = 1).
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βi in Eq. (6.2). It makes the robot infinitely pragmatic, and its trust given the
trustee agent’s capability is reduced to 1 for all tasks with requirements less than
that capability and to 0 for all tasks with requirements greater than that capability.
We achieve this by using a sufficiently large value for βi, for which τi becomes an
analytic approximation of a decreasing step function with the transition from 1 to 0





− λ̄i + λi
)
, (6.4)
where H(x) is the Heaviside function of a continuous real variable x. Considering all
capability dimensions to be independent, and using the approximation in Eq. (6.4)
for computing trust with Eq. (6.3) and Eq. (6.1), we have







1 if 0 ≤ λ̄i ≤ `i,
ui−λ̄i
ui−`i if `i < λ̄i < ui,
0 if ui ≤ λ̄i ≤ 1.
(6.6)
Therefore, for each capability dimension, the robotic trustor agent believes that
the trustee agent’s capability is a random variable λi uniformly distributed between `i
and ui. If a task requires λ̄i < `i, the trustee capability exceeds the task requirement
and trust is 1. Conversely, if λ̄i > ui, the task requirement exceeds the trustee’s ca-
pability and trust is 0. In the intermediate condition, trust decreases with a constant
slope from 1 to 0, corresponding to λ̄i = `i and λ̄i = ui respectively.
Differently from humans, robots can store accurate information for a long time,
and can use this long-term information to update their capability beliefs with a process
different from that presented in Algorithm 2. An alternative is to recursively solve
an optimization problem, considering the history of outcomes observed from different
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tasks γ (with different %(γ) = λ̄ ∈ Λ). Trust is approximated by the number of








Ω(ξ(a), %(γ),m) + f(ξ(a), %(γ),m)
] , (6.7)
and, considering each λ = %(γ), the capability distribution limits `i and ui should be
chosen such that bel(λ, t) =
∏n
i=1 U(ˆ̀i, ûi), and




‖τ − τ̂‖2dλ. (6.8)
For numerical computations, Λ can be discretized and Eq. (6.8) approximated
with a summation, as in Section 6.4.2.
6.3 Experiment
We conducted an online experiment using a Qualtrics survey and the Amazon
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) platform to gather a dataset for comparing our model
with other trust prediction models, such as Soh’s models [115] and OPTIMo [132].
We aimed to emulate a human-AV interaction setting, asking participants to (1) assess
the requirement levels for driving tasks that were to be executed by the AV; (2) watch
videos of the AV executing a part of those tasks; and (3) evaluate their trust in the
AV to execute other tasks (distinct from those they have watched in the videos).
Initially, only images and verbal descriptions of four driving tasks were presented
in random order to the participants. These images and descriptions are presented in
Figure 6.2. Participants were asked to rate the capability requirements for each of the
presented tasks in terms of two distinct capabilities of the AV: sensing and processing.
These capability dimensions were defined and presented to the participants as,
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• Sensing (λs) - The accuracy and precision of the sensors used to map the envi-
ronment where the AV is located and perceive elements within that environment,
such as other vehicles, people, and traffic signs.
• Processing (λp) - The speed and performance of the AV’s computers that
use the information from sensors to calculate the trajectories and the steering,
acceleration, and braking needed to execute those trajectories.
Participants were asked to indicate the required capability levels (λ̄s, λ̄p) ∈ [0, 1]2
for each task providing a score (i.e., indicating a slider position on a continuous scale)
varying from low to high. Although the limits from 0 to 1 were not directly shown to
the participants on the continuous scale, we used the relative positions of the slider
markers to compute their answers for the required capability levels.
After evaluating all four presented tasks, participants watched short videos (ap-
proximately 20s to 30s) of a simulated AV executing three of the four tasks. Those
three were considered observation tasks. The videos showed the AV succeeding or
failing to execute each observation task. Next, participants were asked to indicate
whether the AV did successfully execute the task or not. That question served both
as an attention checker and as a way to make the participant acknowledge the perfor-
mance of the AV in that specific task. After watching each video, participants were
also asked to rate their trust τ in the AV to execute the fourth remaining task (i.e.,
the trust prediction task) on a 7-point Likert scale varying from “Very Low Trust”
to “Very High Trust”, as an indication of how much they disagreed or agreed with
the sentence: “I believe that the AV would successfully execute the task”. They were
asked to consider all videos they had seen during the observation tasks and rate their
trust in the AV to execute the trust prediction task. Finally, participants received
a random 4-digit identifier code to upload in the MTurk platform and receive their
payment.
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Figure 6.2: Tasks presented to the experiment participants in terms of images and
corresponding verbal descriptions. The participants had to rate the capability re-
quirements for each of these tasks, considering two capability dimensions: sensing
and processing. In other words, they had to assign a pair (λ̄1, λ̄2) ∈ [0, 1]2 for each
task. Tasks were randomly presented for avoiding ordering effects.
To keep work-related regulations consistent, we restricted our participants to phys-
ically be in the USA when accepting the MTurk human intelligence task (HIT). A
total of 284 MTurk workers participated in our experiment and received a payment of
$1.80 for completing the HIT without failing to correctly answer the attention checker
questions. The HITs were completed in approximately 6min40s, on average. We col-
lected no demographics data or other personal information from the participants, as
these were not used in our analyses. The obtained dataset and our implementations
are available at https://bit.ly/3sfVtuK. The research was reviewed and approved
by the University of Michigan’s Institutional Review Board.
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6.4 Results
6.4.1 Human-drivers’ (natural) trust in robotic AVs
We implemented a 10-fold cross-validation scheme to train and evaluate our bi-
directional trust model (BTM) with the data obtained in the experiment described
in Section 6.3. For comparison, we also evaluated the performance of Soh’s Bayesian
Gaussian Process model (GP) [115] and of a linear Gaussian model similar to Xu
and Dudek’s OPTIMo (OPT) [132] on our collected dataset. We obtained the tasks’
vector representations required for the GP model with GloVe [91], by processing the
verbal descriptions presented in Figure 6.2. There were no closed analytical forms
for Eq. (6.1), therefore we discretized each task capability dimensions in 10 equal
parts and computed numerical approximations for τ . Since we considered only two
outcome possibilities (fail or success in executing a task), the trust measurements from
both the dataset and the model outputs were considered probability parameters of
Bernoulli distributions. We considered the cross-entropy between those distributions
to be the loss function to be minimized. We used PyTorch [90] to implement all
parameter optimizations with the Adam algorithm [50], using randomized validation
sets comprising 15% of the training data. Two metric scores were computed for the
comparisons among model performances: the Mean Absolute Error (MAE); and the
Negative Log-Likelihood (NLL), which corresponds to the loss function chosen for the
optimizations.
Table 6.1 presents the MAE and NLL scores averaged over the 10 cross-validation
folds (with standard deviations between parentheses) for the BTM, GP and OPT
models. Figure 6.3 complements the table, showing the average learning curves for
both scores and bars representing the average final values with ±1 standard devia-
tions.
Our bi-directional trust model (BTM) outperforms both the GP and the OPT
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Table 6.1: Mean Absolute Error (MAE) and Negative Log-Likelihood (NLL) average





†10-fold results: Mean(Standard Deviation).
‡Best scores in bold.
models after the parameter optimization process. BTM reduces the MAE metric by
approximately 11% as compared with GP, and by 30% as compared to OPT. In terms
of NLL, the use of BTM reduces this metric by approximately 4.3% as compared with
GP model, and by 12% as compared with the OPT model.
6.4.2 Robots’ Artificial Trust in Humans
Besides evaluating and comparing our bi-directional trust model with other trust
models using experimental data, we also implemented simulations to verify its use
in the artificial trust mode (i.e., as a model for predicting a robots’ trust in an-
other trustee agent). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first artificial trust
model, and therefore its performance could not be compared to other models such as
what was done in Subsection 6.4.1. We assumed two unspecified capability dimen-
sions, considering that a trustee agent a’s capabilities were static and represented
by a point ξ(a) = (λ1, λ2) ∈ Λ = [0, 1]2. The trustee agent’s capabilities were ini-
tially unknown by the trustor robot, who must estimate ξ(a) after observing the
trustee’s performances in several different tasks. We considered N fictitious tasks γj,
j ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, and randomly picked N points %(γj) = (λ̄j1, λ̄
j
2) ∈ Λ representing
capability requirements for the tasks. Task outcomes were assigned to each of the
N tasks, with high probability of success for tasks that simultaneously had λ̄j1 ≤ λ1
and λ̄j2 ≤ λ2, and low probability of success when λ̄
j
1 > λ1 or λ̄
j
































= +/- 1 Standard Deviation













Figure 6.3: MAE and NLL learning curves and final values for our proposed trust
model (BTM) and for current trust models from [115] (GP) and [132] (OPT). As the
total number of training epochs is different for each model, their representation on
the horizontal axes of the learning curves is normalized.*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
numerical computations, we discretized both capability dimensions in 10 equal parts,
obtaining 100 bins for Λ. We computed the observed probabilities of success for tasks
inside a bin dividing the number of successes by the total number of tasks that fell
on each bin (i.e., the approximation for τ̂). Finally we ran optimizations to find the
parameters that best characterized bel(λ1, N) and bel(λ2, N), solving the problem
represented by Eq. (6.8).
Figure 6.4 illustrates the evolution of bel(λ,N) and of τ(a, γ,N) for increasing
values of N . The higher the number of observations, the better the accuracy of a’s




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Our model is based on general capability representations that can be either perfor-
mance or non-performance trust factors. This particular aspect of our bi-directional
trust model makes it useful for representing a robot’s artificial trust, as presented
in Subsection 6.4.2, and allows for better human trust predictions in comparison to
existing models, as presented in Subsection 6.4.1. Additionally, our model considers
task capability requirements in its description, describing how hard a task is for an
agent to execute. The model’s mathematical formulation captures the differences be-
tween those task requirements and the potential trustee agent’s observed capabilities.
Differently from the Gaussian process-based method presented in [115], this formula-
tion allows for the adequate representation of lower trust levels when the requirements
of a task exceed the capabilities of the agent and, conversely, higher trust levels when
the agent capabilities exceed the task requirements.
The results shown in Section 6.4.1 reveal that our proposed bi-directional trust
model has better performance for predicting a human’s trust in a robot—in our spe-
cific experiment, an AV—than the models from [132] and [115]. This performance
improvement was expected because current models are limited in capturing impor-
tant trust-related parameters, such as the agents’ capabilities or task’s requirements
in their formulation. To the best of our knowledge, only our model and Soh’s mod-
els [115] distinguish and describe the trust transfer between different tasks, while
OPTIMo [132] is more appropriate for predicting a human’s trust in a robot to exe-
cute one specific task.
Section 6.4.2 presents simulations that show how the proposed model can be used
for representing a robot’s artificial trust. In the future, the proposed bi-directional
trust model could be used in real-world human subjects experiments. An example
could be a study where participants would execute some tasks represented in the
capability hypercube, and the robot would be able to establish its trust in the par-
120
ticipants based on their failures or successes on those tasks. In parallel, the robot
could estimate the human’s natural trust for different tasks, and use both natural
and artificial trust metrics to compute expected rewards for the execution of new
tasks. Tasks could be allocated between the human and the robot to maximize the
expected reward of a whole set of tasks, eventually improving the joint performance
of the human–robot team.
The dynamic allocation of tasks is likely to require the computation of an agent’s
self-trust in parallel with the computations of trust in the counterpart agent. Al-
though the results of the experiment and of the simulations presented in Section 6.4
have not included the computation of natural or artificial self-trust, we consider that
our model can be used for those computations. Our assumptions do not require that
the trustor agent and the trustee agent must be distinct and, our best judgment is
that there are no reasons to impose this restriction to the trust model applicabil-
ity. To facilitate (and possibly improve) the prediction of self-trust and trust in the
other agent, different strategies for updating capabilities and trust over time can be
implemented in parallel with the feedback represented by performance observations.
Humans and robots can use bi-directional communication to influence trust, adding
transparency and explainability regarding their intents and capabilities to adjust ex-
pectations regarding each other.
Despite the eventual improvement on multi-task trust prediction performance, the
use of task capability requirements could also be considered a drawback of our model
because it calls for one more subjective input dimension in comparison with current
models. Rating and describing tasks that must be executed by humans and robots in
terms of specific human/robotic capability dimensions depends on the trustor agent’s
individual beliefs and experiences—natural, in the case of a human trustor agent,
or artificial, in the case of a robotic trustor agent. Our models’ trust prediction
performance might have also been restricted by inconsistencies related to task char-
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acterization by each participant of our experiment. We believe that better trust
prediction results can be achieved with in-person longitudinal experiments involving
fewer participants and more predictions.
6.6 Conclusion and Contribution
This chapter’s main contribution is the proposed multi-task bi-directional trust
model, which depends on both a trustee agent’s proven capabilities (as observed
by the trustor agent) and on the task capability requirements (as characterized by
that same trustor agent). As shown in Section 6.4, our model outperforms the most
relevant and recent trust models (i.e., [132] and [115]) in terms of predicting the
transferred trust between distinct tasks by addressing the main limitations of those
models, mostly related to a lack of task requirements descriptions. With a generalist
capability dimension representing trustee agents’ capabilities, our model can also
represent robots’ artificial trust in different trustee agents. Our model is useful for
future applications where humans and robots collaborate and must sequentially take




This dissertation investigated factors that affect drivers’ trust in ADSs, methods
for processing and influencing drivers’ trust in ADSs, and computational models of
trust. Advances in perception and artificial intelligence technology are expected to
lead to seamless interaction between humans and robots in the near future. In ei-
ther human-robot or driver-ADS interactions, those intelligent autonomous systems
need to understand their human counter part’s behaviors that reflect trust, and adapt
their autonomously generated decisions taking estimates of humans’ trust into con-
sideration. The four main contributions of this dissertation are presented in detail
below.
7.1 Contributions
7.1.1 Investigation and characterization of risk factors that affect drivers’
trust in ADSs
In Chapter III and in [10], we explored the influence of internal and external risk
on ADS trust and on how ADS trust impacts the following trusting behaviors from
AV drivers: ADS monitoring and NDRT performance. We presented a 2×2 (internal
vs. external risk factors) within-subjects user experiment with 37 participants that,
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in summary, contributes to the literature on trust in driver-ADS interaction with the
following main findings:
• Internal risk imposes limits to the expected positive impact of ADS trust and
NDRT performance. In other words, trusting an unreliable ADS will not lead
to better NDRT performance. However, external risk (i.e., low visibility) does
not have a significant influence on ADS trust nor on how ADS trust impacts
NDRT performance.
• Nonetheless, external risk was a factor that moderated the impact of ADS trust
on ADS monitoring. Particularly, this means that when visibility is low, drivers
are generally not able to reduce ADS monitoring, even when they report to be
highly trusting the ADS.
These findings were preparatory for the development of the methods for trust
estimation and trust calibration, which are the next contributions of this dissertation,
described in Chapter IV and Chapter V.
7.1.2 Method for real-time trust estimation
The second contribution of this dissertation is a new real-time method for trust
estimation. This method is based on a Kalman-filter approach that processed “easy-
to-sense” variables, such as the drivers’ focus on the NDRT (obtained with an eye-
tracking device), the drivers’ performance on the NDRT and the drivers’ usage of the
ADS self-driving functions. The method, presented in Chapter IV and in [6], brings
innovations to driver-ADS trust literature, as there was a lack of practical methods
for estimating drivers’ ADS trust.
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7.1.3 Method for trust calibration
The third contribution of this dissertation is the development of a trust calibrator
that leverages the trust estimates resulting from the trust estimation method de-
scribed in Chapter IV. The method for trust calibration consists of identifying trust
miscalibrations (i.e., under- and overtrust) from comparisons between trust estimates
and trust references. These trust references are given by the level of AV capabilities,
which vary according to the driving conditions faced by the driver and the AV. Right
after the identification of trust miscalibrations, different communications from the AV
to the driver are triggered, with corresponding messages and styles. These different
messages and styles have the goal of encouraging undertrusting drivers or warning
overtrusting drivers. The combination of the trust estimator and the trust calibrator
originates the trust management framework, described in detail in Chapter V and [7].
7.1.4 Bi-directional trust model
The fourth and final contribution of this dissertation is a bi-directional trust model
for either predicting a humans’ natural trust or determining a robot’s artificial trust.
This model extends the current applications of the existing trust computational mod-
els, which are mostly used for (humans’ natural) trust prediction only. Moreover,
those existing trust models have several limitations related to transferring trust in an
agent from one task to another different task. In other words, by using the existing
trust models, a robotic system is able to compute a human’s trust in an agent a to ex-
ecute a task γ after that human had observed that same agent a executing that same
task γ. However, accurately computing a human’s trust in that agent a to execute a
different task γ′ (which may or may not be similar to γ) is much more challenging.
The bi-directional trust model proposed in this dissertation makes advances in solving
this problem, as described in Chapter VI and [9].
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7.2 Limitations
Although we have used techniques suitable for data with uncertainty (such as using
a Kalman filter for our trust estimation), the results of our methods could certainly
improve from having larger trust datasets. The relatively small size of the datasets
obtained experimentally was a limiting factor of the trust estimation accuracy. Addi-
tionally, in all methods presented, the trust models had parameters that were averaged
from a pool of participants rather than particularized for each participant, increasing
the uncertainty of the parameters and decreasing the accuracy of trust estimates. In
particular, the experiments described in Chapter III and Chapter IV were sufficient
to show the effectiveness of our techniques. Still, these techniques could have a better
performance if we had more data available. This limitation speaks to the difficulties
involved in analyzing data that were self-reported by human subjects. Self-reported
trust data based on standard questionnaires are particularly noisy and, therefore, it
is extremely challenging to establish accurate ground truths for trust. Participants
are not really capable of precisely estimating their own trust levels, as they are given
constrained standard questionnaires that may not be able to capture all trust facets.
This is not a particular limitation from our work, and it has been considered a big
challenge for the human-robot interaction field [18]. A possible approach to reduce the
uncertainty in both parameters and trust estimates could consist in conducting longi-
tudinal experiments, with a lower number of participants that had more interactions
with the systems in different opportunities, such as daily or weekly. This approach
would allow for the establishment of particular instances of the trust model, with
parameters that were optimized for each participant.
Another limitation that relates to the previous one is that the experiments of
this dissertation were all implemented in simulated environments only and not in
real AVs. Reproducing the risks and the nuances of driving, even in high-fidelity
simulators, is challenging [22]. Because of the possible differences between having
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participants in a simulated environment and in real-world situations, the conclusions
and results presented in this dissertation should be considered part of an incipient
body of knowledge that should be verified and validated in actual AVs. Implementing
the methods proposed in this research in real vehicles would open paths for exploring
new improvements and identifying possible limitations not reproducible in simulation.
We alert the reader, however, that a considerable body of research has pointed out the
similarities between experiments carried out in simulators and in real-world systems
[39,42,73,109,120]. For that reason, we consider that our conclusions are likely to be
reinforced—and not contradicted—by new experiments with real vehicles.
7.3 Future Work
The trust management framework proposed in Chapter V assumes that the AV’s
capability in different driving situations is quantifiable, measurable, and represented
as a discrete ordinal variable (low, medium, and high). While many different meth-
ods to determine the AV’s capability could be proposed, this dissertation refrains
from suggesting how that should be done. For example, the AV could identify in-
appropriate driving conditions, such as being outside of its geofence, or being on an
unsignalized road. Moreover, the AV could process the reliability of its sensors, such
as the GPS processor or the inertial measurement units, which are fundamental for
the dynamic driving task. Therefore, the implementation of the proposed methods
outside the lab-controlled environment will depend on the prior definition of how to
determine the AV’s capabilities. A future research direction could be focused on defin-
ing a methodology for translating the limitations of self-driving functions in different
situations into capability metrics and representing the corresponding trust reference
levels. This research direction would require a deeper investigation of what are the
main weaknesses of current ADSs, and in what situations those ADSs are not ca-
pable of sustaining the dynamic driving task [101]. Additionally, research would be
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required for the definition of methods to identify these situations in real time, with
the specification of possibly new sensors and procedures. The degree of difficulty in-
volved in driving and obtained from the information provided by those sensors could
be eventually reflected by a metric representing the AV capabilities.
Another research direction, more focused on the bi-directional trust model pre-
sented in Chapter VI, is to investigate methods to define and represent task require-
ments and agent capabilities. The bi-directional trust model was established from
high-level capability representations, which were used to characterize both the agent
and the task. In the presented examples, those capabilities were either arbitrarily
assigned by the participants (in the case of the experiment conducted for human nat-
ural trust prediction) or randomly generated (in the case of the simulations for the
definition of a robot’s artificial trust). Moreover, those capabilities were considered
static rather than dynamic variables. For this reason, those capability representations
alone can not capture the possible evolution of the agents’ knowledge or competence
in executing the tasks that are assigned to them over time. As agents can typically
achieve higher levels of performance in some tasks by training, or lose proficiency in
some tasks after long terms without executing these tasks, those agents’ capability
representations must be sufficiently sophisticated so that the capability changes over
time can be accurately characterized. In the future, the proposed bi-directional trust
model could be extended to include not only agents’ capabilities, but also their ca-
pacity, availability, situation awareness and workload. Therefore, a possible direction
for additional research is to deepen the investigation on how to accurately represent
both task requirements and agent capabilities, in order to improve the performance
of the bi-directional trust model.
For the bi-directional trust model to be applied for solving task allocation prob-
lems between a human and a robotic agent, however, it needs to be combined with
numerical representations of task rewards and costs. These rewards and costs may
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depend not only on the task to be executed, but also on the agents themselves. A fun-
damental question in this problem is: how to define the rewards and costs associated
with the execution of a given task by a given agent? Many robotic decision-making
problems are focused on establishing the algorithms to optimize a certain reward or
cost function, but generally ignore how those functions should be defined. Therefore,
a relevant research goal is to investigate how to learn those reward/cost functions
from human demonstration. This goal is very similar to that of the inverse reinforce-
ment learning (IRL) problem, which is to extract a reward function from an observed
optimal behavior [84]. The first step in this investigation could be the assessment
of whether the existing IRL techniques could be applied for solving the problem of
assigning rewards and costs to a set of tasks of a human-robot team.
7.4 Outlook and Impact
This dissertation deepens the knowledge on trust between humans and robotic
systems, with a special emphasis on SAE level 3 AVs (and also higher SAE lev-
els) and their human users. We present novel trust models and processing methods
that are intended to advance towards the development of trust-based techniques for
human-robot (driver-AV) interaction. We focus on contributing for the solutions of
two high-level common problems in HRI: avoiding trust miscalibrations in driver-AV
interactions and allocating tasks between a human and a robotic system that interact
and work together to achieve a joint goal.
The implications of the study presented in Chapter III and the trust estimation
and calibration methods presented in Chapter IV and Chapter V are all directed
at solving the trust miscalibration problem. AV designers and engineers can use
these methods and overall knowledge here presented to actively monitor the human
users’ behavior and to interact with them accordingly in order to reduce trust miscal-
ibrations and, consequently, reduce the occurrence of accidents and improve driving
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performance.
The bi-directional trust model described in Chapter VI allows for the assessment
of how trustworthy a specific agent is to execute a specific task. The model is a
first step for the development of a trust-based control authority allocation framework
based on the following logic: as trust is fundamentally represented by a probability
that the agent will succeed when executing the task, trust can be directly used in
the computation of expected rewards for both the human and the robotic agent
(to execute that task). The agent that a priori maximizes this expected reward is,
therefore, the agent who should be allocated the control authority to execute the task.
The outcome of that task execution should be fed back to update the parameters of





Risk and Trust Surveys
A.1 Post-trial Trust Survey
The following is a reproduction of the questions used in Chapter III and in [10] to
measure participants’ trust in the automated driving systems (ADS) after each trial,
adapted from [83]. The participants were instructed to use slider bars to indicate
the extent to which they believed the autonomy had each of the trust-related traits,
ranging from 1 (none at all) to 7 (extremely high).
• Competence. To what extent did the autonomy perform its function properly?
(In other words, to what extent does the driving autonomy prevent and help
prevent collisions and enable safe multi-tasking?)
• Predictability. To what extent can the autonomy’s behavior be predicted
from moment to moment?
• Reliability over time. To what extent does the autonomy respond similarly
when it encounters similar circumstances at different points in time?
• Dependability. To what extent can you count on the autonomy to do its job?
132
• Responsibility. To what extent did the autonomy perform the task it was
designed to do? (In other words, to what extent does the driving autonomy
drive safely and enable safe multi-tasking?)
A.2 Post-trial Risk Survey
The following is a reproduction of the statements used in Chapter III and in [10]
to measure participants’ perceived risk after each trial, adapted from [100]. The
participants were instructed to place a number ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to
7 (strongly agree) next to each statement to indicate the extent to which they agreed
or disagreed.
Visibility-related statements.
• The weather made the driving situation risky.
• Due to the weather conditions, the likelihood of a collision was high.
• There was a high chance of an accident occurring because of the weather con-
ditions.
• Due to the weather conditions, the driving situation was unpredictable.
Reliability-related statements.
• The reliability of the automated vehicle (AV) made the driving situation risky.
• Due to the reliability of the AV, the likelihood of a collision was high.
• There was a high chance of an accident occurring because of the AV’s reliability.
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